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INTRODUCTION 
If Roe v. Wade1 were overruled,2 could Mary, a citizen of a state that 
prohibited abortions (let’s say Utah), be barred from obtaining abortions in a 
state (let’s say California) in which abortions were legal?  This Article makes 
seven points in relation to answering this question.  All the observations made 
herein are relevant not only to the unlikely event of Roe’s demise, but also to a 
nontrivial class of constitutional state laws that can be circumvented if a citizen 
can cross his state border and avail himself of his neighboring state’s less 
restrictive laws.  This class includes restrictions on gambling and assisted 
suicide, mandatory motorcycle helmet laws, and laws that fix prices for 
agricultural goods.3 
The first point is that, contrary to many people’s strong intuitions, states in 
our country’s federal union generally do have the power to regulate their 
citizens’ out-of-state activities.  Indeed, states have been doing so since the 
earliest days of the republic.  States’ exercise of extraterritorial regulatory 
power has been upheld by the Supreme Court and has been recognized by the 
Model Penal Code and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations.  
Doctrinally, such extraterritorial state powers have been tied to the Tenth 
Amendment.4  Extraterritorial regulatory jurisdiction is limited by due 
process’s requirement that the state regulation be neither “arbitrary nor 
fundamentally unfair,”5 but a state’s regulation of its own citizen’s out-of-state 
 
 1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 2. This is among the difficult constitutional questions that Professor Fallon convincingly 
argues would soon face the Supreme Court in the event Roe v. Wade were overturned.  See 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a Post-Roe 
World, 51 ST. LOUIS. U.  L.J. 611 (2007).  Like Professor Fallon’s contribution, this Article takes 
no position on the question of whether Roe v. Wade should be overruled. 
 3. For a description of the character of such laws, see infra Part I; see also Mark D. Rosen, 
Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 
856–60, 883–86 (2002). 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively . . . .”). 
 5. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981). 
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activities to ensure the efficacy of a legitimate state law would satisfy this 
standard.  This broad extraterritorial state regulatory power has not been 
displaced by the line of Dormant Commerce Clause case law that imposes 
some limits on extraterritoriality.  All these matters are discussed in Part I. 
Points two through four are closely related to one another and accordingly 
are treated together in Part II.  The second point is that although states enjoy 
general extraterritorial regulatory powers, particular extraterritorial regulatory 
efforts plausibly could run afoul of constitutional limitations concerning 
interstate relations that are found in the right to travel, Article IV’s Privileges 
and Immunities Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or 
Immunities Clause.6  Point three is that Utah’s effort to regulate Mary would 
not be precluded under any of these doctrines as they currently are understood 
by the United States Supreme Court.  Point four is that current doctrine 
nevertheless cannot be presumed to be stable because, among other reasons, 
there has not been a sustained practice of such state extraterritorial regulations 
that has received attention from legislatures, the public, and the courts. 
The remaining points (five through seven) are discussed in Part III.  Point 
five is that answering the doctrinal question of whether Utah can regulate 
Mary’s California travels invariably will turn on normative considerations 
because, among other reasons, the question is not answered by clear 
constitutional text, longstanding tradition, or precedent. 
The sixth point clarifies the normative question that is presented by Utah’s 
regulatory attempts in relation to Mary.  Whether Utah should have such 
extraterritorial powers is an exceedingly difficult question that goes to the heart 
of the meaning of state citizenship and national citizenship and, ultimately, to 
the nature of our country’s federal union:7 Does the “right to travel” and/or 
national citizenship entail that Mary have a right to the legal entitlement to 
abortion that is enjoyed by Californians while Mary visits the Golden State? 
Some have so argued,8 but consider the implications.  With regard to those 
policies that neither the Constitution nor federal statutory law demands 
national uniformity, it is widely recognized that states may take different 
regulatory approaches.  Not infrequently, however, a state will be unable to 
accomplish its constitutionally legitimate policy goals if its citizen can free 
herself of her home state’s regulation simply by walking into a state that does 
not so regulate.  If the regulating state does not have the power to preclude 
“travel-evasion” of its legitimate policies, then the extent of the pluralism of 
 
 6. Though I speak here of these constitutional principles as playing a structural role in 
establishing the nature of interstate relations, I do not mean to suggest that they do not also 
establish personal rights. 
 7. I fully agree with Professor Fallon in this regard.  See Fallon, supra note 2, at 632–48; 
see Rosen, supra note 3, at 911. 
 8. See Seth F. Kreimer, Lines in the Sand: The Importance of Borders in American 
Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 973, 981–84 (2002). 
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state policies possible under our federal union is, as a practical matter, quite 
limited with regard to those policies that are vulnerable to travel-evasion.  Call 
this a regime of “soft” pluralism.  By contrast, a federal system in which Utah 
can prohibit Mary from obtaining an abortion in California would be a regime 
of “hard” pluralism in which states can efficaciously regulate across the entire 
range of matters with respect to which federal law does not demand nationwide 
uniformity.  To be clear, the sixth point does not seek to definitively resolve 
the choice between “soft” and “hard” pluralism, but only aims to show that the 
choice is a difficult one and that much rides on how the question is resolved. 
The seventh point is largely institutional: what societal institutions are to 
make the choice between “soft” and “hard” pluralism?  Points one and three 
together establish that, as a purely descriptive matter, our country presently has 
a regime of “hard” pluralism; each state can decide on its own whether it 
wishes to extraterritorially regulate its citizens and thereby maximize the 
efficacy of their regulations or whether it is content ensuring that its citizens 
comply with its regulations only while they are within state borders.  Point 
seven makes clear that these state-by-state decisions may be legislatively 
reversed by Congress (in conjunction with presidential participation by virtue 
of presentment).  Congress has the power to determine the scope of state 
extraterritorial powers under the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s “Effects” 
Clause, Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment (in relation to what 
qualifies as a privilege or immunity of national citizenship), the Commerce 
Clause,9 and possibly Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause.10  Point 
seven further argues that Congress (and the President) properly have privileged 
roles in answering such questions because they have institutional advantages 
vis-B-vis both states and the federal courts in deciding the scope of state 
extraterritorial regulatory authority and in thereby determining the nature of 
state and federal citizenship and the resulting character of our federal union. 
Before proceeding, I would like to flag an important question that this 
Article does not explore: how Utah would enforce its extraterritorial regulation 
of Mary.  Though this is a question that merits serious consideration, space 
limitations allow only a few observations here.  First, even difficult-to-enforce 
regulations can have effects in respect of both norm-creation and behavior.11  
Second, there are a variety of options that could be utilized to enforce 
 
 9. I explain later in the Article why the Commerce Clause is a less suitable source of 
congressional power than the above mentioned sources.  See infra Part III.C.2.b. 
 10. See Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 1468, 1485–88 (2007).  For more discussion concerning the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause as a source of congressional power, see infra Part III.C.2.b. 
 11. Cf. Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided?—Some New Answers, 
95 CAL. L. REV. 451 (2007) (showing that racially restrictive covenants that were legally 
unenforceable nevertheless may have facilitated the creation of racially segregated housing 
markets). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] “HARD” OR “SOFT” PLURALISM? 717 
extraterritorial regulations, including disclosure requirements that entail 
penalties for misrepresentations, extradition,12 and federal legislation that 
aimed to support the state law.13  Third, the degree of enforceability will turn 
on the precise subject of extraterritorial regulation.  Accordingly, even if 
privacy concerns or pragmatics were to preclude some enforcement options in 
relation to Mary, these options might be available vis-B-vis an extraterritorial 
regulation that seeks to ensure compliance with (for instance) a state law that 
sets prices for agricultural products.14  One accordingly should not generalize 
from the enforceability of Utah’s (hypothetical) extraterritorial anti-abortion 
statute to the enforceability of other extraterritorial regulations. 
I.  STATES’ BASELINE POWERS TO REGULATE THEIR CITIZENS’ OUT-OF-STATE 
CONDUCT (POINT ONE) 
A comprehensive analysis of the scope of a state’s powers to regulate its 
citizen’s out-of-state activities requires analysis of multiple federal 
constitutional principles.  Under contemporary doctrine, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause15 determines the presumptive scope of a 
state’s regulatory jurisdiction.16  Other constitutional principles—most 
importantly the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities 
 
 12. The Extradition Clause requires State A to yield person Z within its territory to 
extraditing state B even if the activities that Z has been accused of committing would not 
constitute a crime in state A.  See Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 225 (1987) (reaffirming 
the holding of Kentucky v. Dennsion, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860), which “rejected the 
position . . . that the Extradition Clause required only the delivery of fugitives charged with acts 
which would be criminal by the law of the asylum State”).  For a more expansive consideration of 
similar enforcement questions, see Mark D. Rosen, Why The Defense of Marriage Act is Not 
(Yet?) Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors that 
Determine What the Constitution Requires, 90 MINN. L. REV. 915, 989–99 (2006). 
 13. For example, bills that have been passed by both houses of Congress prohibit “taking 
minors across State lines in circumvention of [state] laws requiring the involvement of parents in 
abortion decisions.”  Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act, S. 403, 109th Cong. (2006); 
Child Custody Protection Act, S. 403, 109th Cong. (2006); 152 CONG. REC. S8151–88 (daily ed. 
July 25, 2006) (providing the version passed in the Senate); 152 CONG. REC. H7412–22 (daily ed. 
Sept. 26, 2006) (providing the version passed in the House). 
 14. For such a law, see Rosen, supra note 3, at 859–60, 930–32. 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 16. To be analytically clear, the Due Process Clause is not the source of state extraterritorial 
regulatory power; the Court has understood such powers to be an incident of state sovereignty 
that has been retained under the Tenth Amendment, see Rosen, supra note 3, at 865–66 
(analyzing relevant case law), and the Due Process Clause instead provides the (initial) limit on 
such state powers.  Nevertheless, courts frequently conflate these distinct analytical steps and 
speak of the scope of state regulatory authority as being determined by the Due Process Clause.  
For ease of exposition, the discussion that follows above in text will utilize the common parlance. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
718 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:713 
Clause,17 the Privileges or Immunities Clause,18 and the right to travel—
impose discrete but important limitations on states’ extraterritorial regulatory 
powers. 
This Part I shows that, notwithstanding some eloquent arguments to the 
contrary,19 states have extensive presumptive powers to regulate their citizens’ 
out-of-state activities under contemporary Due Process doctrine, and that this 
conclusion is not undermined by dicta in some Dormant Commerce Clause 
cases that speak about limitations on state extraterritorial powers.  Parts II and 
III more closely examine limits on such extraterritorial powers that may be 
imposed by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, and the right to travel. 
A. Due Process 
To be clear, the only question this Article explores is the extent of a state’s 
power to regulate its own citizen’s efforts to opt out of its laws via travel-
evasion; it does not address the scope of state A’s regulatory powers over the 
activities of a citizen of state B that occur in State B.  A few of the cases 
discussed below nonetheless address state A’s regulatory powers over citizen 
B’s conduct in state B.  Why?  I imagine that almost everyone would agree that 
Utah has a greater claim to regulate its own citizen’s conduct in California than 
to regulate the conduct of a California citizen in California.  For this reason, 
appreciating that the Constitution does not flatly foreclose even the latter 
regulatory effort is relevant to understanding the scope of state A’s regulatory 
powers over its own citizens’ extra-state activities. 
Under contemporary constitutional law, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause is the primary determinant of the presumptive scope of a state’s 
 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges 
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”). 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”). 
 19. Professor Kreimer first advanced the argument that states lacked the power to regulate its 
citizens’ extraterritorial activities in two articles in the early 1990s.  See Seth F. Kreimer, “But 
Whoever Treasures Freedom . . .”: The Right to Travel and Extraterritorial Abortions, 91 MICH. 
L. REV. 907 (1993) [hereinafter Kreimer, “But Whoever Treasures Freedom . . .”]; Seth F. 
Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, the Right to Travel, and 
Extraterritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451 (1992) [hereinafter 
Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law].  I took issue with Professor Kreimer’s 
arguments (and those of several other fine academics) in an article a decade later.  See Rosen, 
supra note 3.  Professor Kreimer authored a nearly fifty-page response that appeared in the same 
issue of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, with respect to which the Law Review’s 
publishing constraints allowed me only a footnote to reply.  See Kreimer, supra note 8; Rosen, 
supra note 3, at 862 & n.28.  Here I provide a fuller answer, in turn, to Professor Kreimer’s 
response. 
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regulatory jurisdiction.20  Though perhaps surprising to many, the United 
States Supreme Court long has upheld the power of states to regulate activities 
that occur outside their borders.21  In the 1911 case of Strassheim v. Daily, for 
example, the Court permitted Michigan to prosecute a person who was not a 
citizen of Michigan for acts he undertook while he was in Illinois to defraud 
the state of Michigan.22  Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes wrote that 
“[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing 
detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm 
as if he had been present at the effect.”23  Thirty years later, in Skiriotes v. 
Florida, the Court upheld the application of a Florida statute prohibiting 
sponge fishing to a Florida citizen’s activities that occurred wholly outside of 
Florida’s territorial waters.24  The Skiriotes Court analogized Florida’s 
extraterritorial regulatory powers to the unquestioned power of the federal 
government to regulate United States citizens when they are “upon the high 
seas or even in foreign countries”25 and adverted to the Tenth Amendment as 
the source of similar state extraterritorial powers.26 
These Supreme Court cases in effect endorsed extraterritorial powers that 
had been exercised by states since the beginning of our nation’s history.  For 
example, a Virginia statute enacted in 1792 criminalized “all felonies 
committed by citizen against citizen in any such place.”27  In 1819, the General 
Court of Virginia held that this statute supported the Virginia Attorney 
General’s prosecution of a Virginia citizen for having stolen a horse in the 
District of Columbia that belonged to a fellow citizen of Virginia.28  
 
 20. It is far from obvious that a constitutional provision primarily geared toward protecting 
individual rights is the appropriate place from which the structural question of the scope of states’ 
legislative jurisdiction is to be derived.  Cf. James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins 
of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169 (2004) (arguing 
that state adjudicatory jurisdiction is more properly derived from the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 
not the Due Process Clause).  I plan to turn my attention to this question in the future.  For present 
purposes, however, I’m interested only in engaging in positive analysis. 
 21. For a fuller discussion of these and other cases, see Rosen, supra note 3, at 871–91. 
 22. 221 U.S. 280, 281–82 (1911). 
 23. Id. at 285. 
 24. 313 U.S. 69 (1941). 
 25. Id. at 73. 
 26. Id. at 77. 
 27. Commonwealth v. Gaines, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 172, 173 (1819) (quoting Act 1. Rev. 
Code, 1792, ch. 136, § 7). 
 28. See id.  Interestingly, the Virginia court’s decision contained an important choice-of-law 
holding: what qualified as a “felon[y]” was to be determined by Virginia law, not the law of the 
place where the activity occurred.  See id. at 181.  The dissenters in the case acknowledged that 
“it is competent for a State to legislate rules of conduct for its citizens while resident beyond its 
territorial limits,” but did not believe that the Virginia legislature had intended to create such an 
extraterritorial regulation.  Id. at 183 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  The Virginia legislature modified 
the statute in 1819 to make clear that it did not intend to extend extraterritorial jurisdiction.  See 
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Nineteenth century Texas law provided that “persons out of the State may 
commit and be liable to indictment and conviction for committing any of the 
offenses enumerated in this chapter which do not in their commission 
necessarily require a personal presence in this State . . . .”29  Interpreting this 
law, an 1882 Texas decision upheld the application of Texas’ criminal law to 
an act of forgery of a land certificate for Texas property even though all the 
criminal acts had occurred in the State of Louisiana.30  The court further 
observed that Texas criminal law could be applied even if the defendants’ acts 
were “no crime against the State in which it [was] perpetrated.”31  A 1915 
Delaware law criminalized a married citizen’s second marriage in another state 
if the first marriage had not been dissolved,32 which was applied to a Delaware 
husband who married a second woman in Florida and then returned to his first 
wife in Delaware, never thereafter communicating with the second woman.33  
An 1891 statute in West Virginia provided that: 
if a person be stricken or poisoned out of this state, and die by reason thereof 
within this state, the offender shall be as guilty, and may be prosecuted and 
punished, as if the mortal stroke had been given, or poison administered, in the 
county in which the person so stricken or poisoned may so die.34 
These statutes and cases thus absolutely refute the claim that has been put forth 
by one scholar that “the understanding of the scope of the sovereign power of 
states before the middle of the twentieth century did not include the right to 
regulate citizens extraterritorially.”35 
Relying on Strassheim, Skiriotes, and on longstanding state practices, 
scholarly restatements of the law reflect the understanding that States have 
presumptive extraterritorial power to criminally and civilly regulate their 
citizens’ out-of-state conduct.  The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
Law provides that States “may apply at least some laws to a person outside 
[State] territory on the basis that he is a citizen, resident or domiciliary of the 
 
id. at 182.  Professor Fallon’s contribution to this symposium brought the Gaines case to my 
attention.  See Fallon, supra note 2, at 631 n.85. 
 29. Hanks v. State, 13 Tex. Ct. App. 289, 305 (Ct. App. 1882) (quoting Tex. Cr. Code, art. 
454). 
 30. Id. at 305, 308–09. 
 31. Id. at 309. 
 32. See State v. Bacon, 112 A. 682, 682 (Del. 1920) (“If any inhabitant of this state shall go 
out of the state and contract a marriage contrary to this section, with intention to return and reside 
in this state, and shall return accordingly, such person, notwithstanding such marriage shall be 
solemnized, or contracted, out of this state, shall be liable to be indicted, tried, convicted and 
punished in the same manner as if the said marriage had been solemnized, or contracted, within 
this state.” (quoting Del. Rev. Code 1915, §4785, par. 2)). 
 33. See id. at 682. 
 34. Ex parte McNeely, 14 S.E. 436, 436 (W. Va. 1892) (quoting W. Va. Code 1891, c. 144, 
§6). 
 35. Kreimer, supra note 8, at 978. 
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State.”36 The Restatement asserts that this principle applies to both 
extraterritorial criminal and civil legislative powers.37  Directed to the criminal 
context, the Model Penal Code provides that State A may impose liability if 
“the offense is based on a statute of this State that expressly prohibits conduct 
outside the State . . . .”38  Indeed, the Model Penal Code affirms that State A 
has extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction even if the activity it prohibits occurs 
in a State in which the activity is permissible.39  The major limitation identified 
by the Model Penal Code is that the regulated conduct must “bear[] a 
reasonable relation to a legitimate interest of [the regulating] State . . . .”40  The 
Comment states that the “reasonable relation to a legitimate interest” 
requirement “expresses the general principle of the fourteenth amendment 
limitation on state legislative jurisdiction.”41 
The constitutional limitation on state regulatory jurisdiction noted in the 
Model Penal Code’s Comment has been grounded by the Court in the Due 
Process Clause.42  Case law requires that there be “a significant contact . . . 
creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor 
fundamentally unfair.”43  As I have shown elsewhere, citizenship on its own 
has virtually sufficed to give the home state sufficient interest to regulate its 
citizens’ out-of-state activities for purposes of the Due Process Clause.44  This 
is sensible insofar as a “state has an enduring contact with its citizen and an 
interest in their well-being.”45  Though I agree with Professor Fallon that no 
cases “say[] . . . that the citizenship or residence of one of the parties is 
necessarily sufficient to justify a state in applying its law to an out-of-state 
occurrence,”46 it would seem that a state’s additional interest in regulating to 
ensure that its citizen not undermine legitimate state policies would qualify as 
any additional “plus” beyond mere citizenship that would justify state 
extraterritorial regulation.  This conclusion would appear to follow from the 
 
 36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 n.5 (1987). 
 37. The Restatement is explicit about this.  See id. § 403 cmt. f (“The principles governing 
jurisdiction to prescribe set forth in § 402 and in this section apply to criminal as well as to civil 
regulation.”). 
 38. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(1)(f) (1962). 
 39. Id. § 1.03(2). 
 40. Id. § 1.03(1)(f). 
 41. See id. § 1.03 cmt. 6.  The Comment, however, neglects to consider other constitutional 
limitations that bear on the constitutionality of a state’s extraterritorial regulation.  See Rosen, 
supra note 3, at 870 & n.59. 
 42. For some doubts as to whether the Due Process Clause is the most appropriate 
constitutional provision to ground such structural limitations on state power, see supra note 20. 
 43. Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981)). 
 44. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 871–76. 
 45. Fallon, supra note 2, at 630. 
 46. Id. at 630 n.80 (emphasis added). 
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case law that upholds extraterritorial state regulatory powers in relation to non-
citizens: such powers understandably are more limited than the state’s powers 
vis-B-vis its own citizens, yet case law has permitted states to regulate the 
extraterritorial activities of non-citizens that are purposefully directed at 
undermining legitimate state interests (as in the Supreme Court case of 
Strassheim and the Texas case of Hanks v. State, both discussed above).47 
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.48 
confirms that states have a legitimate interest in their citizens’ out-of-state 
activities if such activities undermine legitimate state policy.  That case upheld 
a federal statute that prohibited the radio broadcast of lottery advertising by 
radio licensees located in nonlottery states.49  The broadcaster in Edge was 
located in North Carolina, a nonlottery state, but wanted to broadcast Virginia 
lottery advertisements.50  As part of its First Amendment analysis, the Edge 
Court concluded that the statute directly advanced the federal government’s 
interest of “support[ing] the antigambling policy of a State like North Carolina 
by forbidding stations in such a State [from] air[ing] lottery advertising.”51  If 
North Carolina already forbade lotteries in North Carolina, in what respect did 
the federal statute “support” North Carolina’s anti-gambling policy?  The 
answer is that Congress and the Court understood that North Carolina’s anti-
gambling policy would have been undermined had the broadcaster been 
permitted to broadcast advertisements for an activity that was legal in another 
state but prohibited in North Carolina. 
Stated differently, the Court understood that North Carolina’s anti-
gambling policy would have been undermined by a North Carolina citizen’s 
out-of-state conduct, even if the gambling occurred in a state in which the 
activity were legal.52  This makes sense.  An anti-lottery policy might be based 
on a conclusion that “lotteries play on the hopes of those least able to afford to 
purchase lottery tickets, and that its citizens would be better served by 
spending their money on more promising investments,”53 and “these objectives 
would be undermined regardless of where gambling occurs.”54  In short, since 
Edge held that the federal government has a legitimate interest in supporting 
North Carolina’s policy concerning North Carolina citizens’ out-of-state 
 
 47. See supra text accompanying notes 19–20, 25–26. 
 48. 509 U.S. 418 (1993). 
 49. Id. at 421, 425. 
 50. Id. at 423–24. 
 51. Id. at 428. 
 52. For further discussion, see Rosen, supra note 3, at 879 & n.106. 
 53. Edge, 509 U.S. at 440 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 54. Rosen, supra note 3, at 880.  For further discussion, see id. at 880 & n.108. 
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gambling, it follows that North Carolina’s underlying policy of concerning 
itself with its citizens’ out-of-state activities is itself legitimate.55 
Professor Fallon appears to be of the view that the strongest due process-
based argument against extraterritorial state regulatory authority comes from 
language in the 1975 opinion of Bigelow v. Virginia56 to the effect that 
Virginia could not “prevent its residents from traveling to New York to obtain 
[abortion] services or, as the State conceded, prosecute them for going there.  
Virginia possessed no authority to regulate the services provided in New 
York . . . .”57  Though I agree that this is the strongest argument that can be 
made, I do not think it to be particularly robust.  First, the language from 
Bigelow was dicta,58 as Professor Fallon apparently agrees.59  Second, in 
 
 55. The analysis of Edge provided above is fully consistent with the analysis I provided in an 
earlier article.  See id. at 879–80.  Professor Kreimer’s criticism of my analysis of Edge attributes 
positions to me that I do not hold.  The point of my analysis of Edge is that the case confirms that 
states may have a legitimate interest for purposes of due process in their citizens’ out-of-state 
activities—a point that Professor Kreimer now concedes.  See Kreimer, supra note 8, at 990 
(“North Carolina itself has an ‘interest’ sufficient to seek to prohibit gambling on its own territory 
and to seek to dissuade its residents from gambling in neighboring Virginia . . . .”).  I at no point 
suggested that Edge’s analysis—which concerns First Amendment limits on Congress—on its 
own establishes that “North Carolina [has] authority to prosecute its residents for disregarding its 
norms within a sister state . . . .”  Id. at 991.  I simply argued that if the Court concluded that a 
federal policy of supporting state policy “X” is legitimate, then it is fair to conclude that the Court 
believed that state policy “X” itself was legitimate.  Here state policy “X” was concern with its 
citizens’ out-of-state activities, and the conclusion that this constitutes a legitimate policy is 
relevant to the due process inquiry that determines the scope of state regulatory jurisdiction.  See 
Rosen, supra note 3, at 879–80.  For this reason, I believe that Professor Kreimer is wrong to 
assert that Edge’s analysis “does not implicate the question of whether North Carolina itself may 
prosecute its citizens for playing the Virginia lottery.”  Kreimer, supra note 8, at 990. 
  Finally, Professor Kreimer takes me to task for arguing that the Edge Court’s conclusion 
that the federal interest was “derivative” of the state interest overlooks the fact that the federal 
government has “separate and distinct” powers from the states on account of the fact that 
“Congress’s regulatory authority, unlike that of the states, extends to the entire country.”  Id. at 
990.  I am well aware of the important institutional differences between the federal and state 
governments—indeed, I have written at length on this subject.  See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, 
Institutional Context in Constitutional Law: A Critical Examination of Term Limits, Judicial 
Campaign Codes, and Anti-Pornography Ordinances, 21 J.L. & POL. 223 (2005) [hereinafter 
Rosen, Institutional Context]; Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring 
Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1520–23 (2005).  I accordingly was not 
suggesting that states enjoy the same regulatory powers that Congress has, but simply meant that 
the Court’s finding of a legitimate federal interest in supporting North Carolina’s policy must 
have followed from an antecedent conclusion that the North Carolina policy itself was legitimate.  
See Rosen, supra note 3, at 879.  This is all I intended to signify by the term “derivative.” 
 56. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
 57. Id. at 822–24 (citations omitted).  I conclude that this is Professor Fallon’s view on the 
basis of his discussion at Fallon, supra note 2, at 628–29. 
 58. To my mind, Professor Donald Regan has convincingly argued that this language from 
Bigelow is dicta.  See Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of 
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Professor Fallon’s words, Bigelow’s “categorical claim that states may never 
enact or enforce extraterritorial criminal legislation seems too strong.”60  After 
all, Bigelow’s categorical claim, if taken seriously, would have overturned the 
longstanding Supreme Court precedent and state practice discussed above and 
declared various provisions of scholarly restatements and model codes 
unconstitutional without so much as even mentioning those cases, practices, 
and materials.  Third, post-Bigelow case law has limited Bigelow’s dictum.61  
 
America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 
MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1907–08 (1987).  Professor Kreimer countered that “[c]haracterizing the 
Bigelow principle as dictum is a dubious move” for three reasons.  Kreimer, The Law of Choice 
and Choice of Law, supra note 19, at 459 & n.27 (1992).  I responded to Professor Kreimer’s 
argument, see Rosen, supra note 3, at 891–96, and he to mine, see Kreimer, supra note 8, at 988–
89.  The core dispute between my position and Professor Kreimer’s, it seems to me, is semantic: 
does reasoning that is (1) unnecessary to the Court’s disposition, (2) contrary to longstanding 
practice and multiple Supreme Court precedents, and (3) propounded without even mentioning 
these longstanding practices and precedents, much less considering how the new reasoning relates 
to such practices and precedents, constitute dicta?  Such reasoning, it seems to me, is dicta.  If 
Professor Kreimer prefers to characterize my argument as a suggestion that Bigelow’s “holding” 
has been “narrowed” by subsequent cases I will not protest too loudly, as the line between 
discarding dicta and narrowing an earlier holding can be gossamer.  The more important point for 
present purposes is the following: for the reasons discussed above in the text, Bigelow’s 
categorical assertion that states lack extraterritorial regulatory authority should not be understood 
to have effect today, if indeed it ever did. 
 59. See Fallon, supra note 2, at 629 & n.75. 
 60. Id. at 629. 
 61. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 893–96 (discussing United States v. Edge, 509 U.S. 418 
(1993) and Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986)).  
I showed in an earlier article that Posadas explicitly limited Bigelow.  The Posadas Court 
explained that Virginia’s advertising regulations in Bigelow were unconstitutional only because 
the “underlying conduct that was the subject of the advertising restrictions [abortion] was 
constitutionally protected and could not have been prohibited by the State.”  Id. at 895 (quoting 
Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345–46).  This means that State A has a presumptive power to restrict 
advertisements for out-of-state activities that State A could ban.  Professor Kreimer’s near fifty-
page response to my article did not respond to this argument.  See generally Kreimer, supra note 
8.  The Edge decision, discussed above, confirms that State A may have an interest in activities 
undertaken by its citizens in State B.  See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
  The principle from Edge that State A has a legitimate interest in its citizens’ out-of-state 
activities has not been undermined by the case of Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. 
United States (GNOBA).  527 U.S. 173 (1999).  Referring to GNOBA, Professor Kreimer writes 
that “[w]hen the Supreme Court finally addressed federal efforts to shore up local moralisms 
extraterritorially by preventing broadcasters in states where gambling was legal from conveying 
information to listeners in states where gambling was illegal, it invalidated them.  This is not a 
strong line of authority for extraterritorial moralism.”  Kreimer, supra note 8, at 991–92.  There 
are two problems with Professor Kreimer’s argument.  First, this is a misleading description of 
the case, for the GNOBA Court took pains to note that federal efforts failed only because the 
operation of the statute at issue “and its attendant regulatory regime is so pierced by exemptions 
and inconsistencies that the Government cannot hope to exonerate it.”  GNOBA, 527 U.S. at 190; 
see also id. at 195 (“Had the Federal Government adopted a more coherent policy . . . this might 
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Although two recent cases have quoted the Bigelow dictum in the course of 
lengthy string cites, the reference has been for the purpose of establishing the 
very different (and virtually noncontroversial) principle that State A “does not 
have the power . . . to punish [a defendant] for conduct that was lawful where it 
occurred and that had no impact on [State A] or its residents.”62  That 
principle clearly has no bearing whatsoever on the question of whether State A 
has the power to regulate its own citizens’ out-of-state conduct for the purpose 
of ensuring that its legitimate policies not be undermined. 
To quickly conclude, states have a legitimate interest in their citizens’ out-
of-state activities to support the conclusion that states have presumptive 
extraterritorial regulatory authority under the Due Process Clause, Bigelow 
notwithstanding.63 
 
be a different case.”).  GNOBA accordingly teaches nothing about the scope of a state’s 
extraterritorial authority, but only establishes that an inconsistent federal approach to supporting 
state policies will not satisfy First Amendment scrutiny.  Second, Professor Kreimer’s argument 
that Edge and GNOBA “is not a strong line of authority for extraterritorial moralism” is a straw 
man: if these two were the only cases concerning state extraterritorial power Professor Kreimer 
would have a point, but a proper analysis of state extraterritorial powers would not begin with 
case law dating from the 1990s.  Rather, the “line of authority” extends back into the nineteenth 
century, and when the modern decisions of Edge and GNOBA are considered in conjunction with 
longstanding practice, the Supreme Court decisions of Skiriotes and Strassheim, and scholarly 
restatements and model codes, the basis for state extraterritorial regulatory power is quite strong 
indeed.  
 62. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572–73 (1996) (emphasis added); see also 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421–22 (2003) (holding that in 
assessing punitive damages a jury cannot take account of a defendant’s out-of-state conduct that 
was “lawful where it occurred and that had no impact on [the State] or its residents”) (quoting 
Gore, 517 U.S. at 572–73).  With the exception of the Bigelow dictum, the other cases to which 
the Court cites in both Gore and State Farm are very old cases from the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries that reflect a widespread understanding of that era that governmental powers 
did not extend beyond a polity’s physical border.  See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 421–22; Gore, 517 
U.S. at 571–72.  A work-in-progress documents that this “territorialist” view that physical borders 
demarcate the end-point of a government’s powers was never given categorical effect, shows the 
larger conceptual apparatus of which this “territorialist” view was a part and that it as well as 
territorialism was eclipsed in the mid-twentieth century across multiple doctrines, and explains 
why the contemporary understanding is superior.  See Mark D. Rosen, Overlapping 
Governmental Powers (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  Quotations from these older 
cases that appear in string cites in both the Gore and Campbell decisions employ a rhetoric that 
reflects the older “territorialist” perspective that is inconsistent with the practices, case law, and 
scholarly restatements that this Section A has examined at some length.  I hope that my work-in-
progress will definitively resolve the tension that exists in the case law as regards the significance 
of physical borders by once and for all discrediting (or, at the least, severely limiting) the older 
cases. 
 63. In Lines in the Sand: The Importance of Borders in American Federalism, Professor 
Kreimer recites a “series of cases” he had discussed in two of his articles with which he says I had 
“decline[d] to come to grips” in my piece on extraterritorial state powers.  Kreimer, supra note 8, 
at 993 n.77.  My extraterritoriality article had responded to what I judged to have been Professor 
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B. Dormant Commerce Clause 
Professor Fallon concludes that “[a]mong the most serious challenges to 
the constitutionality of states’ efforts to stop their citizens from obtaining out-
of-state abortions would involve the Dormant Commerce Clause”64 on account 
 
Kreimer’s strongest arguments.  The cases he takes me to task for ignoring offer little support for 
his position, but since he has referenced them once again let me briefly explain why they do not 
support his position.  It is true that the Court in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), 
reh’g denied, 371 U.S. 905 (1965), “took as given the constraint that California could punish 
legitimately only for the actual use of narcotics ‘within the state,’” Kreimer, supra note 8, at 993 
n.77, but that is not because the Court assumed that California could not regulate 
extraterritorially.  Rather, the Supreme Court assumed as it did because the “instructions of the 
trial court, implicitly approved on appeal, amounted to ‘a ruling on a question of state law that is 
as binding on us as though the precise words had been written’ into the statute,” and the lower 
court instructions permitted conviction only upon a showing that the defendant “did use a narcotic 
in Los Angeles County, or that while in the City of Los Angeles he was addicted to the use of 
narcotics.”  Robinson, 370 U.S. at 663, 666. 
  All the other cases Professor Kreimer cites are tax cases that are consistent with the 
position I espouse.  I shall treat only the most recent case he cites, Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, 
Division of Taxation. 504 U.S. 768 (1992).  If anything, Allied-Signal supports rather than 
undermines the approach to due process this Article embraces.  The case stands for two 
propositions: that (1) a single business can be taxed by multiple states, but that (2) each state’s 
taxation is limited to the extent that “there be ‘some definite link, some minimum connection, 
between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.’”  Id. at 777 (quoting Miller 
Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1954)).  Similarly, my claim is that (1) more than 
one state (home and visitor) can simultaneously regulate a person, but that (2) the home state has 
extraterritorial regulatory power only when the out-of-state activity has a definite link to the home 
state (i.e., as when the activity can circumvent the home state’s legitimate policy).  Those out-of-
state activities that can undermine the legitimate state policy thus constitute the constitutional 
predicate for extraterritorial regulation, and this seems to be fully consistent with the tax cases’ 
principle that “there must be a connection to the activity itself, rather than a connection only to 
the actor the State seeks to tax.”  Id. at 778. 
  Indeed, the tax cases explicitly reject any strict territoriality notion that the state can tax 
only those monies that arise from in-state transactions or in-state assets.  Rather, the “unitary 
business principle” that the Court adopts permits a state to tax a share of the business that is 
carried on in other states.  See id. (explaining that the unitary business doctrine grew from state 
efforts to tax railroad and telegraph companies, during which time it became apparent that “what 
makes such a business valuable is the enterprise as a whole, rather than the track or wires that 
happen to be located within a State’s borders”).  To be sure, states can only tax those monies that 
are “apportionable” to the state, but what is pertinent to the discussion at hand is that the unitary 
business principle rejects apportionment on the basis of “geographical . . . accounting.”  Id. at 
778, 783.  Similarly, I argue that home states’ regulatory powers are not exclusively determined 
by physical location but are a function of the fact that a citizen’s out-of-state activities that 
undermine legitimate policies of her home state are reasonably apportionable (so to speak) to the 
home state.  I do not mean to push the analogy too far, for tax laws are sui generis in many 
respects, but certainly the tax law to which Professor Kreimer cites does not undermine the 
principles developed above in text that the Due Process Clause does not prohibit states from 
regulating their citizens’ extraterritorial activities. 
 64. Fallon, supra note 2, at 636. 
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of language from several cases that would appear to bar state regulations of 
out-of-state commerce.  In one case, for instance, the Court stated that “the 
‘Commerce Clause . . . precludes the application of a state statute to commerce 
that take place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or not the 
commerce has effects within the State.’”65 
Some comments are in order here, much of which I am quite certain 
Professor Fallon would agree with.  To begin, even if categorical effect were to 
be given to such anti-extraterritorial statements, states would not be 
categorically prohibited from seeking to extraterritorially regulate their 
citizens.  This is because Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine provides only 
default baseline rules, which may be altered by Congress.66  States accordingly 
would be free to seek federal legislation that permitted the state extraterritorial 
regulation that Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine proscribed.  Congress 
would have the power to do so because, by definition, any state regulatory 
matters that could be precluded on account of the Dormant Commerce Clause 
could be congressionally permitted under Congress’s Commerce Clause 
powers.67  I am certain Professor Fallon would not disagree. 
Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, there are strong reasons to doubt 
that the Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause anti-extraterritoriality statements 
are best read as categorical proscriptions on state powers to regulate commerce 
that occurs outside the state’s borders.68  Dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence utilizes two different sorts of legal tests—a virtual per se rule of 
illegality for protectionist regulations and a far more deferential balancing test 
for nondiscriminatory regulations that incidentally burden interstate 
commerce—and the cases in which the Court has propounded its categorical 
condemnations of state extraterritorial regulations have involved state laws that 
 
 65. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 
624, 642–43 (1982)). 
 66. See, e.g., Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 66 (2003); Metzger, supra note 10, 
at 1481. 
 67. Indeed, Congress also has the power to determine the scope of state regulatory authority 
in respect of matters that fall outside of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.  See infra Parts II, 
III.  In light of Congress’s power to legislatively overturn the Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence, I chafe at Professor Fallon’s terminology that the Court’s Dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence poses “the most serious challenges to the constitutionality” of state 
extraterritorial powers.  Fallon, supra note 2, at 636 (emphasis added).  Although courts and 
commentators regularly refer to Dormant Commerce Clause constraints as constitutional 
limitations, Dormant Commerce Clause limitations are better conceptualized as federal common 
law rather than constitutional determinations on account of Congress’s power to revise the 
Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.  See Rosen, supra note 11. 
 68. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 919–30. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
728 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:713 
were clearly protectionist.69  Accordingly, a plausible positive case can be 
made that the Court’s proscriptions against extraterritorial regulation are 
properly limited to protectionist statutes, and that non-protectionist state 
regulations that extraterritorially regulate a state’s citizens are properly 
analyzed under the more lenient balancing test that invalidates only those state 
regulations that impose burdens on commerce that are clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative benefits.70 
Limiting the Court’s anti-extraterritorial statements in this fashion is 
sensible for several reasons.  First, categorically disallowing state power to 
regulate out-of-state transactions would be inconsistent with longstanding 
practice and precedents.  In Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.71 
for example, the Court upheld the application of a Louisiana law that 
disregarded a contractual provision that had been entered into by two foreign 
corporations outside of Louisiana despite the fact that the provision was 
consistent with the law where the contract had been formed.72  The Watson 
 
 69. See id. at 922–26.  Professor Fallon appears to agree.  See Fallon, supra note 2, at 638.  
Professor Kreimer has been unable to find any case law to the contrary.  See Kreimer, supra note 
8, at 995–96. 
 70. Known as “Pike balancing,” this test comes from the case Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 71. 348 U.S. 66 (1954). 
 72. The plaintiff, a Louisiana resident, was injured in Louisiana while using a hair-waving 
product that had been produced by the Toni Company of Illinois, a subsidiary of a Massachusetts 
corporation.  Id. at 67.  The manufacturer had entered into an insurance contract with the 
defendant in the case, a non-Louisiana corporation.  Id.  The insurance contract had been 
negotiated and issued in Massachusetts and had been delivered both to the Toni Company in 
Illinois and to the parent company in Massachusetts.  Id.  The contract contained a “no action” 
clause, which “prohibit[ed] direct actions against the insurance company” until there had been a 
final determination of the insured’s liability to pay personal injury damages.  Id. at 67–68. 
  Although “no action” clauses were recognized as binding and legal in Massachusetts and 
Illinois, Louisiana’s “direct action” statute proscribed them.  Id. at 68.  The plaintiff in Watson 
directly sued the insurance company before having obtained a final judgment or settlement 
against the Toni Company, and the insurance company moved to dismiss in reliance on the “no 
action” clause.  Id.  In the Supreme Court, the insurance company argued that “because the policy 
was bought, issued and delivered outside of Louisiana,” that state was “without power to exercise 
‘extraterritorial jurisdiction,’ that is, to regulate and control activities wholly beyond its 
boundaries.”  Id. at 71.  The Court rejected this argument, ruling that Louisiana could apply its 
statute to an insurance contract between a non-Louisiana insurance company and a non-Louisiana 
insured that had been negotiated, made, and delivered outside of Louisiana.  Id. at 73.  Louisiana 
was justified in applying its statute to the out-of-state contract, the Watson Court held, because 
“Louisiana’s direct action statute is not a mere intermeddling in affairs beyond her boundaries 
which are no concern of hers.  Persons injured or killed in Louisiana are most likely to be 
Louisiana residents, and even if not, Louisiana may have to care for them.”  Id. at 72.  For these 
reasons, the Court held that Louisiana had “legitimate interest in safeguarding the rights of 
persons injured.”  Id. at 72–73.  Application of Louisiana regulations to a non-Louisiana 
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case thus upheld Louisiana’s regulation of an out-of-state contract, and the 
Supreme Court’s most recent Due Process jurisprudence approvingly referred 
to the Watson decision.73  Yet the Watson decision, and many others,74 would 
be imperiled if the categorical anti-extraterritoriality statements found in the 
Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence were taken at face value. 
Second, notwithstanding the Court’s abovementioned observations in its 
Dormant Commerce Clause cases, “[s]tate regulations are routinely upheld 
despite what is obviously a significant impact on outside actors.”75  Consider, 
for example, products liability actions against out-of-state manufacturers and 
nuisance actions against polluters across the border.76  In short, to date the 
Court has not applied its anti-extraterritoriality principle to reach the many 
non-protectionist state regulations that impose effects on out-of-state 
commerce. 
Third, giving broad application to the Court’s anti-extraterritoriality 
statements would be an unwelcome throwback to an earlier jurisprudential era 
that has wisely been eclipsed.  Contemporary law is to be praised for moving 
away from the earlier effort to localize transactions and occurrences as having 
“happened” in one place such that only one state had regulatory jurisdiction.77  
The new understanding is that “a set of facts giving rise to a lawsuit, or a 
particular issue within a lawsuit, may justify, in constitutional terms, 
application of the law of more than one jurisdiction.”78  This modern approach 
is advisable on account of the many factors79 that frequently conspire to create 
circumstances where several states have real interests in the same matter, 
interests that undermine the logic of seeking to identify a single place where a 
 
insurance company did not raise due process concerns because the company was certified to do 
business in Louisiana.  See id. at 68–69 & n.5. 
 73. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 & n.17 (1981) (holding that states may 
apply their law consistently with the requirements of due process and full faith and credit when 
the state has sufficient interests such that application of its law is neither arbitrary nor 
fundamentally unfair). 
 74. See, e.g., Ala. Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935) (applying 
California workman’s compensation law to an employee injured in Alaska where the employer 
was a non-Californian and the employment contract provided that Alaska Workmen’s 
Compensation Law was to apply). 
 75. Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
110 YALE  L.J. 785, 803 (2001). 
 76. See id. at 795. 
 77. Space limitations preclude me from fully developing and defending the point made in the 
paragraph above in text (and in fact is the subject of a work-in-progress).  See Rosen, supra note 
62.  An example of the earlier approach that sought to locate events and transactions in a single 
polity was the “vested rights” doctrine in the field of conflict of laws.  See Rosen, supra note 3, at 
940. 
 78. Allstate, 449 U.S. at 307. 
 79. Such circumstances creating interests include the fact that many occurrences span 
several states and the spillover effects that a transaction or occurrence may have. 
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transaction or occurrence has “happened” such that only a single polity can 
apply its law.  In lieu of presuming that only one jurisdiction properly can 
regulate each transaction or occurrence, today’s doctrine regularly permits 
multiple states to exercise concurrent regulatory jurisdiction over a single 
person, transaction, or occurrence.80 
In short, the Supreme Court’s anti-extraterritoriality statements in its 
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence harken back to the now-discredited 
era in which concurrent jurisdiction was resisted.  The Court’s statements 
categorically constraining states’ extraterritorial authority should be confined 
to circumstances where states are pursuing protectionist agendas.81  To broadly 
deny states the power to regulate matters that occur outside their borders 
problematically hampers them by depriving states of the power over matters 
that Due Process and Full Faith and Credit doctrines wisely have recognized as 
being legitimate state interests. 
 
 80. See generally Rosen, supra note 3, at 945–63.  Although concurrent jurisdiction creates 
complications, the attempt to replace it with a system of non-overlapping regulatory jurisdiction 
would simplify matters at too great a cost.  For a discussion of this, see id. at 933–45. 
 81. Professor Kreimer criticizes my argument that the Court’s anti-extraterritorialism 
statements should not be extended beyond protectionist legislation.  See Kreimer, supra note 8, at 
995–96.  His first justification, that “[t]hese are categories of formidable obscurity, for one 
person’s public welfare is another person’s protectionism,” id. at 995–96, flies in the face of 
longstanding Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, which long has drawn distinctions between 
protectionist and non-protectionist state legislation.  See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 
437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).  Indeed, it is 
unclear how much constitutional doctrine would remain if legal tests utilizing what some might 
believe to have “obscure” borders were eliminated.  Next, Professor Kreimer argues that “cases 
which uphold ‘health and safety’ justifications in other Commerce Clause contexts do not rely on 
‘morals,’ which seem to be the key ‘third party effects’ on which Professor Rosen relies.”  
Kreimer, supra note 8, at 996.  This argument is specious for three reasons: (1) a fair reading of 
my article reveals that it was concerned with a wide range of state interests that could be 
undermined by a citizen’s extraterritorial activities, see Rosen, supra note 3, at 877, not just or 
even primarily with moral interests; (2) most extraterritorial regulations, including those related 
to abortion, could be justified on multiple bases (for instance, extraterritorial abortion regulations 
plausibly could be justified on the policy of protecting unborn fetuses as well as moral 
considerations); and, in any event, (3) the logic the Court has embraced in adopting its lower level 
scrutiny carries over to morals legislation: the Court has said that laws that “relat[e] to the health, 
life, and safety of their citizen,” which derive from what “is compendiously known as the police 
power,” are permissible if they do “not discriminate against interstate commerce or operate to 
disrupt its required uniformity.”  Head v. N.M. Bd. of Exam’rs in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 428–
29 (1963).  Finally, the parade of horribles that Professor Kreimer recites would not occur 
because my rejection of a per se ban on extraterritorial regulation does not call for eliminating all 
judicial review of state legislation.  Some of the hypotheticals Professor Kreimer describes appear 
to be purely protectionist efforts that would be unlawful as a per se matter, and the others likely 
would fail under Pike balancing. 
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II.  INTERSTATE RELATIONS PRINCIPLES POTENTIALLY RELEVANT TO STATE 
EXTRATERRITORIAL REGULATIONS (POINTS TWO THROUGH FOUR) 
Part I showed that states are not without power to regulate their out-of-
state citizens.  This does not mean, however, that there are no limits on state 
extraterritorial regulatory powers.  Section A of Part II identifies several 
constitutional principles relating to interstate relations that plausibly may be 
relevant to determining whether a particular exercise of extraterritorial 
regulation is impermissible.  Section B shows that Utah’s effort to regulate 
Mary would not be precluded under any of these doctrines as they currently are 
understood by the Supreme Court.  Section C suggests, however, that Section 
B’s conclusion cannot be presumed to be stable because there has not been a 
sustained practice of state extraterritorial regulations that has received 
thoroughgoing attention from legislatures, the public, and the courts. 
A. Constitutional Principles Relevant to Analyzing Utah’s Effort to Regulate 
Mary (Point Two) 
Although States have presumptive powers to regulate their citizens’ out-of-
state conduct, several constitutional principles potentially constrain the 
exercise of this power.82  These principles limit states’ baseline extraterritorial 
powers for the sake of securing a particular sort of federal union.  The primary 
aspect of federalism these constitutional principles help determine is the nature 
of interstate relations—what is generally termed “horizontal” federalism—not 
the more typically analyzed “vertical” relationship between the federal 
government and states.83  As a result of these constitutional principles, some 
extraterritorial state regulations unquestionably, and quite properly, are 
constitutionally impermissible. 
The constitutional doctrines that, as a matter of first principles, potentially 
could constrain state extraterritorial regulations are the right to travel, Article 
IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Citizenship Clause and Privileges or Immunities Clause.  It plausibly could be 
argued, for example, that Utah’s effort to apply its restrictions to Mary while 
she is in Utah violates Mary’s constitutional right to travel; the freedom to 
partake of the liberties that California affords while one is in California, it 
 
 82. Professors Lea Brilmayer and Seth Kreimer each have propounded additional 
“structural” arguments against state extraterritorial regulatory powers in relation to deeply 
contested policy questions.  See Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Preemption: The Right to Travel, The 
Right to Life, and the Right to Die, 91 MICH. L. REV. 873, 876 (1993); Kreimer, “But Whoever 
Treasures Freedom . . .”, supra note 19, at 922.  I have fully recounted their arguments and, I 
believe, discredited them.  See Rosen, supra note 3, at 933–45. 
 83. For an admirably clear discussion of the difference between vertical and horizontal 
federalism, see Metzger, supra note 10, at 1511–15. 
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might be said, is necessary if the right to travel is to be meaningful.84  
Similarly, a respectable argument can be made that Article IV’s guarantee that 
“[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities 
of Citizens in the several States”85 means that Mary is entitled to “all privileges 
and immunities” enjoyed by California citizens when she visits California, 
including the privilege of availing herself of California’s abortion laws.86  
Likewise, it could be argued that the “privileges or immunities” of being a 
“citizen[] of the United States” include that a traveling citizen be entitled to the 
full array of benefits that are enjoyed by the citizens of the states through 
which she is traveling.87 
Another way to think about all of this is that these three constitutional 
principles are important determinants of what state and national citizenship 
mean in our country’s federal union.  Indeed, the arguments sketched in the 
immediately preceding paragraph, taken together, would create a particular 
type of federal union.  After showing below in Section B that contemporary 
doctrine does not dictate the legal conclusions postulated in the paragraph 
immediately above, but in fact would permit Utah to regulate Mary, Part III 
considers the nature of the federal union that the arguments above would erect 
and then contrasts that with the alternative conception of federalism that 
contemporary doctrine currently embraces. 
B. Contemporary Doctrine (Point Three) 
This Section B shows that contemporary doctrine pertaining to the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, the right to travel, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s national Citizenship Clause and Privileges or Immunities Clause 
would not bar Utah from regulating Mary during her travels to California.88 
 
 84. For a clear articulation of this position, see Kreimer, supra note 8, at 1006–08. 
 85. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
 86. See Kreimer, supra note 8, at 983–84. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Although contemporary case law has treated Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities 
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s national Citizenship Clause and Privileges or 
Immunities Clause as “components” of the right to travel, see Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500–
03 (1999), cases also continue to treat each of these as distinct constitutional principles.  See, e.g., 
Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 66–68 (2003).  In other words, the right to travel has 
not wholly swallowed these other constitutional principles.  Consistent with this precedent, I will 
treat these as distinct constitutional principles.  Indeed, these principles’ continuing independent 
existence is sensible because there is no reason to think that the right to travel exhausts the scope 
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the national Citizenship Clause, or the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause. 
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1. The Privileges and Immunities Clause 
Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause provides that “[t]he citizens 
of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in 
the several States.”89  As I have shown at length elsewhere, the United States 
Supreme Court has unwaveringly held for more than a century and a quarter 
that the Clause constrains the ways that a state may act toward visitors from 
other states, but that it does not apply at all to a state’s regulation of its own 
citizens.90  There is sensibility to this distinction between host states (to which 
the Clause applies) and home states (to which it does not).  As is suggested by 
its universally accepted moniker, the “Comity Clause,” the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause has been concerned with ensuring peaceful relations among 
the states.  Interstate peace is threatened when one state treats visitors 
differently than it treats its own citizens, but is not generally jeopardized by 
how a state regulates its own citizens.91  In more modern parlance, the Comity 
Clause has been understood as a constitutional principle that serves a 
representation-reinforcement function by limiting the extent to which the 
paradigmatic unrepresented outsiders—non-citizens—can be regulated by a 
polity.92  In short, under contemporary doctrine, which is grounded in 
longstanding precedent, the Comity Clause does not have even threshold 
application to Utah’s efforts to regulate its own citizen’s (Mary’s) activities 
when she is in California. 
 
 89. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
 90. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 900–03.  Although Professor Kreimer acknowledges that the 
Court in Bradwell held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause did not apply to the home state 
and ultimately acknowledges that his theory (that the Comity Clause should apply to home states 
as well as host states) would require that the Court “break some new ground,” Professor Kreimer 
advances some hard-to-justify positions along the way.  Kreimer, supra note 8, at 1003 & n.121.  
He says that my argument that “Zobel v. Williams relied on the inapplicability of the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause is mysterious” because “Zobel invalidated the statute at issue” and 
“therefore, the Court could not have relied on the validity of the statute under Article IV.”  Id. 
(citations omitted).  This is puzzling.  The statute at issue in Zobel, which applied only to Alaskan 
citizens but discriminated in its treatment of longstanding residents and new state citizens, was 
challenged on both Privileges and Immunities and Equal Protection grounds.  See Zobel v. 
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 56–58 (1982).  While it is true that the statute was invalidated, the Court 
struck it down solely on Equal Protection grounds, explicitly holding that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause was inapplicable because the statute only regulated citizens.  Id. at 65.  The 
majority opinion, which I quoted in my previous article, stated as follows: 
The statute does not involve the kind of discrimination which the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Art. IV was designed to prevent.  That Clause “was designed to 
insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges which the 
citizens of State B enjoy.”  The Clause is thus not applicable to this case. 
Zobel, 457 U.S. at 59–60 n.5 (citations omitted) (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 
(1948)); see also Rosen, supra note 3, at 902 (quoting and discussing same).  This would 
constitute a holding on virtually every definition of that term, pace Professor Kreimer.  The Court 
reiterated this understanding two years later in United Building & Construction Trades Council v. 
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It might be objected that even if the Privileges and Immunities Clause does 
not apply to Mary’s home state of Utah, it requires that California grant Mary 
the same access to abortion while she visits the Golden State that is enjoyed by 
Californians, regardless of what Utah law requires.  It is very unlikely, 
however, that the Privileges and Immunities Clause would impose any such 
duty on California.93  The Privileges and Immunities Clause does not generate 
an “absolute” duty for states to treat citizens and non-citizens alike.94  Rather, 
states are permitted to draw lines between citizens and non-citizens—meaning 
that California can deny Mary access to abortion facilities that California 
residents are free to use—if “there is a substantial reason for the difference in 
treatment” and “the discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears a 
substantial relationship to the State’s objective.”95 
The question thus would become whether California’s interest in not 
meddling in Utah’s regulation of peripatetic Mary would qualify as a 
 
Mayor & Council of Camden though its comments in Camden admittedly were not necessary to 
the case’s ultimate disposition.  465 U.S. 208, 217 (1984) (noting that “disadvantaged New Jersey 
residents have no claim under the Privileges and Immunities Clause” in respect of a New Jersey 
statute solely because they are citizens of the regulating state). 
 91. I say “not generally” because it is possible, of course, for a state to regulate its citizens in 
a manner that could breed interstate dissension, for instance by forbidding its citizens from 
purchasing goods from another state.  These types of regulations, however, are addressed by other 
doctrines (in this case, the Dormant Commerce Clause). 
 92. See Camden, 465 U.S. at 217 (stating that New Jersey residents do not have a Privileges 
and Immunities Clause challenge to a New Jersey law because “New Jersey residents at least 
have a chance to remedy at the polls any discrimination against them”); JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
 93. I believe this to be a very strong conclusion.  In any event, even if my argument above in 
text was wrong and the Privileges and Immunities Clause precluded California from withholding 
its benefits from visitors from other states, this would not mean that the home state’s 
extraterritorial regulation was illicit.  Rather, this would mean that Mary would confront a 
situation where the host state permits an activity that her home state proscribes.  There is nothing 
unconstitutional, or even particularly unusual, about such conflicts where two or more polities 
have concurrent regulatory authority; indeed, the Model Penal Code anticipates this possibility 
and specifically provides that a home state can prohibit its citizens from engaging in an activity 
out of state that is permitted in that state.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(2) (1962); see also 
Rosen, supra note 3, at 870.  Under such circumstances, there are a variety of steps the home state 
can take to ensure compliance with its regulations.  See Rosen, supra note 12, at 989–99.  For 
additional discussion of such conflicts, see supra note 90. 
 94. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 (1999) (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 
(1948)). 
 95. Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 298 (1998).  For examples of state 
laws discriminating as between residents and nonresidents that were upheld against Privileges and 
Immunities Clause challenges, see Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 
390–91 (1978) (addressing a statute that required nonresidents to pay more than residents for 
hunting license); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 445 (1973) (addressing a statute that charged 
nonresidents more to attend state university). 
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“substantial” reason for purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  
There are very good reasons for concluding in the affirmative.  As I have 
explained elsewhere at length, the cases striking down host state laws that 
discriminated between citizens and non-citizens all have involved instances 
where the host state sought to benefit itself at the expense of the home state, 
not instances where the host state sought to assist the home state.  The Court 
has recognized that this distinction between “the unilateral imposition of a 
disadvantage upon nonresidents” and deference to another state’s laws is 
determinative in the context of Privileges and Immunities doctrine,96 and this 
makes perfect sense to a doctrine that is designed to reduce interstate friction 
and facilitate harmonious interstate relations.97  Indeed, even outside the 
context of the Comity Clause, the Court has upheld as constitutionally 
legitimate a host state’s desire to withhold the benefits of its law to a visitor for 
the purpose of supporting the home state’s contrary policy.98  For all these 
reasons, under contemporary law, the Privileges and Immunities Clause in all 
likelihood would not preclude a state (such as California) from trying to 
accommodate a sister state’s (Utah’s) contrary policies. 
A final possible objection may appear to remain: even if California is not 
constitutionally required to apply its abortion law to Mary, surely California is 
not disallowed from permitting Mary access to its abortion facilities.  While 
this in all likelihood is true,99 it does not undermine the question this Article 
 
 96. See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 667 n.12 (1975) (distinguishing between 
“unilateral imposition of a disadvantage upon nonresidents” and “the value of reciprocity”). 
 97. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 904–09; see also Larry Kramer, The Myth of the 
“Unprovided-for” Case, 75 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1065–69 (1989) (providing a similar analysis). 
 98. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).  Sosna upheld against Equal Protection and 
right to travel challenges an Iowa law that imposed a one-year residency requirement for divorce.  
Id. at 395, 410.  The Court held that the Iowa law “may reasonably be justified” as reflecting the 
State’s desire to avoid “officious intermeddling in matters in which another State has a paramount 
interest.”  Id. at 406–07.  What made the other state’s interest paramount was the divorce 
petitioners’ de facto citizenship: the petitioners for divorce in Iowa might really intend to return to 
their true home states after obtaining an Iowa divorce, and in such a circumstance their home 
states have the paramount interest.  See id. at 407. 
 99. The statement in the text above that California would apply its law to Mary likely is true 
for two reasons.  First, California can apply its law because it has a constitutionally legitimate 
basis for applying its law to a visitor.  See, e.g., Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident 
Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 502 (1939).  Second, no federal constitutional provision would require 
California to disregard its own law and apply another state’s law instead.  See Rosen, supra note 
12, at 933 & n.60 (explaining that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not generally require one 
state to apply another state’s law).  This was not always the case, though.  Early case law required 
State A to apply the law of State B when State B’s interest was paramount.  It would not be 
unthinkable to conclude that, on balance, Utah’s interest in regulating Mary’s abortion decision is 
greater than California’s for so long as Mary remains a citizen of Utah.  Though case law has 
abandoned this approach, Congress likely has power under the Effects Clause to approach Full 
Faith and Credit as the Court used to.  See Rosen, supra note 12, at 960–70.  There is much to be 
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examines, whether Utah can regulate Mary’s out-of-state activities.  This is 
because the mere fact that California can regulate Mary says nothing about 
another state’s power to regulate Mary.  Under American law, multiple states 
frequently have overlapping regulatory jurisdiction, meaning that they both can 
apply their regulations simultaneously to a given transaction or occurrence, 
“even when the states’ regulations substantively conflict.”100  Indeed, this 
extends even to the criminal realm, such that two states with regulatory 
jurisdiction over a particular activity can regulate with the result that the very 
activity that is permitted by one state may be criminalized by the other.101 
2. The Right to Travel 
Though the right to travel is a long-recognized constitutional principle, 
Utah’s effort to regulate Mary while she is in California would not implicate 
the right to travel as it has been doctrinally developed to date.  To begin, no 
Supreme Court case has held that State A’s effort to bar its citizen from doing 
in State B what State B permits its own citizens to do implicates the right to 
travel.102  Further, the United States Supreme Court recently presented a 
restatement of the right to travel in Saenz v. Roe,103 and none of the “three 
different components” of the right that it identified would apply to such 
extraterritorial regulations.104  Utah’s regulation does not interfere with: 
[1] the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, [2] the 
right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when 
temporarily present in the second State, [or] [3] for those travelers who elect to 
 
said for the notion that Full Faith and Credit doctrine properly takes account of the quantum of 
the competing states’ interests in a matter in determining which state has the power to regulate, 
see Rosen, supra note 3, at 960–62, and the institutional incapacities that plagued courts’ efforts 
to formulate a principled doctrine that would accomplish this are not faced by legislatures.  See 
Mark D. Rosen, Should ‘Un-American’ Foreign Judgments Be Enforced?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 783, 
817–23 (2004). 
 100. Rosen, supra note 3, at 949.  See generally id. at 946–55.  Most “conflicts” between state 
laws do not impose conflicting duties on a person that cannot simultaneously be satisfied because 
“conflicts” most typically arise where State A bars an activity that State B permits but does not 
mandate.  See id. at 958–59.  California policy permitting nonresidents access to its abortion 
facilities would create this sort of conflict.  Conflicting state laws that actually imposed 
inconsistent obligations that cannot be simultaneously satisfied, while rare, cannot be tolerated in 
a federal union.  The only solution is to depart from the norm of concurrent regulatory 
jurisdiction and permit only one law to apply.  I have argued elsewhere that the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, not the Dormant Commerce Clause, is the appropriate doctrinal locus for 
determining which state has the power to apply its law in such circumstances.  See id. at 960–62. 
 101. See id. at 950. 
 102. See id. at 913–19; see also Kreimer, supra note 8, at 1008 (acknowledging this). 
 103. 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999). 
 104. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 913–14. 
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become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that 
State.105 
The third component patently has no application since Mary has no intention to 
make California her permanent home and the first component would not be 
triggered because Utah is not preventing Mary from leaving Utah.  Although 
the second component at first may sound as if it would be applicable to Utah’s 
extraterritorial regulation, the Court has made clear that the second component 
is none other than Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause,106 and that 
provision, as shown immediately above in Part II.B.1, applies to host states 
(California in this case) but not to a citizen’s home state (in this case Utah). 
3. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause and Privileges or 
Immunities Clause 
Nor would the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause nor its 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, as they have been understood to date, apply 
to Utah’s extraterritorial regulations.  The opening words of the Fourteenth 
Amendment declare the existence of national citizenship (designated persons 
are “citizens of the United States”) and proclaim that “[n]o State shall make or 
enforce any law that shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States.”107  The Slaughter-House Cases infamously defined the 
content of “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” quite 
minimally to include a narrow set of rights.108  Among these is “that a citizen 
of the United States can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of 
the Union by a bona fide residence therein, with the same rights as other 
citizens of that State.”109  The Saenz Court relied on this construction of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause to ground what it called the “third component” 
of the right to travel, which Saenz then utilized to strike down provisions of a 
California law that gave new citizens of California less generous welfare 
benefits than were provided to longstanding Californians.110 Utah’s 
 
 105. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500. 
 106. See id. at 501 (“The second component of the right to travel is . . . expressly protected by 
the text of”  the Privileges and Immunities Clause). 
 107. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 108. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S (16 Wall.) 36, 79–80 (1872) (privileges or immunities of 
national citizenship include “the right of the citizen of this great country, protected by implied 
guarantees of its Constitution, to ‘come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have 
upon that government, to transact any business he may have with it, to seek its protection, to 
share its offices, to engage in administering its functions.  He has the right of free access to its 
seaports, through which all operation of foreign commerce are conducted, to the subtreasuries, 
land offices, and courts of justice in the several States.’” (quoting Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 
Wall.) 35, 44 (1867))). 
 109. Id. at 80. 
 110. See Saenz, 526 U.S at 511. 
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extraterritorial regulation would not fall under the privileges or immunities of 
national citizenship that were the subject of Saenz, nor under the other 
privileges or immunities identified in the Slaughter-House Cases.111 
Finally, no other cases have identified additional rights apart from the 
aforementioned “privileges or immunities” that arise from the national 
citizenship that is declared in the Fourteenth Amendment’s first sentence.112  
Taken together, this means that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship 
Clause and Privileges or Immunities Clause, as they have been understood to 
date, would not apply to Utah’s regulations of Mary. 
C. That Current Doctrine Cannot Be Safely Assumed to Be Settled in 
Relation to States’ Extraterritorial Powers (Point Four) 
Although current constitutional doctrines would not preclude Utah from 
prohibiting Mary from obtaining an abortion in California, it could not be 
safely assumed that the current state of the law discussed immediately above in 
Section B is settled.  This is so for several reasons.  First, although states have 
been regulating their citizens’ extraterritorial conduct from the earliest days of 
our country’s history,113 the practice has not been widespread and has not 
received considerable attention.  There accordingly is not a societal consensus 
concerning extraterritorial regulation embodied either in widespread practice 
or broad-ranging acceptance that this is a legitimate (albeit unusual) form of 
state regulation.  Nor has the Supreme Court ever directly confronted the 
constitutionality of a home state’s effort to extraterritorially regulate its 
citizens to ensure that they do not seek to circumvent the home state’s policies. 
Another cause for uncertainty as to the stability of the jurisprudence 
surveyed above is that two of the doctrinal formulations leave ready room for 
further development.114  Consider first the right to travel.  The Court in Saenz 
stated that “‘[t]he right to travel’ discussed in our cases embraces at least three 
different components.”115  This indicates that the three components are not 
necessarily exhaustive of the right to travel.  Moreover, a plausible argument 
can be made that Utah’s regulation already falls within an expanded form of 
the “first” component of the right to travel: the right to leave one state to visit 
another, it might be said, would become but a “hollow shell” if the home state 
 
 111. See supra note 99. 
 112. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 511 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting the same). 
 113. See supra notes 21–35 and accompanying text. 
 114. This is not always the case.  When the Court explained the political question doctrine in 
Baker v. Carr, for example, it explicitly stated that the six factors it identified as predicates for a 
finding of nonjusticiablity under the doctrine were an exhaustive list.  369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) 
(“Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no 
dismissal for non-justiciability on the ground of a political question’s presence.”). 
 115. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500 (emphasis added). 
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can preclude its traveling citizen from enjoying all the benefits that another 
state allows its citizens.116 
Consider next the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities 
Clause.  Although the Slaughter-House Cases’ enumeration of the contents of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause has not been expanded by subsequent case 
law, Slaughter-House itself expressly understood that it was providing a non-
exhaustive list.  Before furnishing its famous enumeration, after all, the Court 
said as follows: 
  Having shown that the privileges and immunities relied on in the argument 
are those which belong to citizens of the States as such . . . and [are] not by this 
article placed under the special care of the Federal government, we may hold 
ourselves excused from defining the privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
United States which no State can abridge, until some case involving those 
privileges may make it necessary to do so. 
  But lest it should be said that no such privileges and immunities are to be 
found if those we have been considering are excluded, we venture to suggest 
some which owe their existence to the Federal government, its National 
character, its Constitution, or its laws.117 
As to the final doctrine examined above, Article IV’s Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, the doctrine as formulated is less inviting of alteration than 
the right to travel or the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities 
Clause.  The doctrine is not written in language that explicitly invites 
expansion.  Further, as regards the doctrinal issue that would be relevant to the 
Comity Clause’s application to Utah’s regulation—whether that Clause applies 
to home states—case law for more than a century consistently has 
unequivocably answered “no.”118  There nevertheless have been some 
scholarly calls for changing the doctrine.  Professor Kreimer has argued that 
the Court should modify contemporary doctrine so that the Comity Clause 
would also apply to the home state.119  Professor Fallon believes that this is a 
“plausible argument”120 since the Comity Clause, read literally, does not 
differentiate between home and host states.  I think the textual argument to be 
less strong than may at first appear because the Comity Clause is found in 
Article IV, and the rest of Article IV deals with relationships among the states, 
not a single state’s relationship with its own citizens.  But this is far from a 
 
 116. See Kreimer, supra note 8, at 1007; see also Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: 
Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend the Future—Or Reveal the Structure of the 
Present?, 113 HARV. L. REV. 110, 152 (1999). 
 117. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78–79 (1872) (emphasis added). 
 118. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 119. Kreimer, supra note 8, at 1003 & n.121. 
 120. Fallon, supra note 2, at 635. 
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devastating objection,121 and I agree that the text of the Comity Clause 
plausibly could be read to entitle a Utah citizen who is visiting California to 
“all Privileges and Immunities” that are enjoyed by the California citizens in 
California. 
In the end, whether the longstanding, consistent precedent establishing that 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause is inapplicable to home states should be 
abandoned primarily turns, it seems to me, on straightforward normative 
arguments.  The same is true for the direction that the right to travel and the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause takes.  For these reasons, it is to normative 
considerations that this Article now turns. 
III.  NORMATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS (POINTS FIVE 
THROUGH SEVEN) 
Having shown in Part I that states have extraterritorial regulatory powers 
and in Part II that several constitutional principles potentially could be 
developed so as to limit such powers, this Part III explains why normative 
considerations invariably will influence how doctrine ultimately is developed 
(Section A), shows that there are powerful arguments on behalf of two 
different approaches to answering the question of whether states should have 
extraterritorial powers to regulate their citizens (Section B), and then considers 
which governmental institutions are best suited to choosing between the two 
alternatives (Section C). 
A. The Triple Duty Played by Normative Considerations (Point Five) 
On the assumption that the current doctrine is not necessarily stable, 
answering the doctrinal question of whether Utah may regulate Mary’s 
California visit invariably will turn on normative considerations for three 
reasons.  First, whether Utah’s extraterritorial regulation triggers as a threshold 
matter any of the constitutional principles discussed above—the right to travel, 
 
 121. For one reason, the Guarantee Clause, which is found in Article IV, could be said to 
address a state’s relationship with its own citizens.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States 
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”).  But see 
Metzger, supra note 10, at 1497 (construing the Guarantee Clause as concerning interstate 
relations).  Further, a state’s regulation of its own citizens could have interstate effects.  It also 
might be objected that Article IV is a “structural” rather than a rights-generating part of the 
Constitution, though I am skeptical of the utility of this distinction insofar as structural limitations 
on governmental power frequently can be said to generate rights on the part of individuals not to 
be regulated in a particular fashion.  In any event, it simply is not the case that Article IV does not 
contain provisions that generate individual rights.  The Full Faith and Credit Clause, for example, 
certainly has been a source that individuals have relied on to claim the right to have a judgment 
obtained in one state’s courts enforced in another.  See, e.g., Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 
(1908) (citing the Full Faith and Credit Clause in argument for enforcing a Missouri judgment in 
Mississippi). 
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the privileges or immunities of national citizenship, or Article IV’s Privileges 
and Immunities Clause—is not answered by clear constitutional text, 
longstanding tradition, or precedent.  Accordingly, determining whether (1) 
Utah’s extraterritorial regulations would even implicate “right to travel” 
concerns as a threshold matter, whether (2) the “privileges or immunities” that 
flow from national citizenship entail some right to have access to the goods 
and services available in the sister states to which a United States citizen 
travels, and whether (3) the “privileges and immunities” of state citizenship to 
which a traveling citizen of State A is entitled may as a threshold matter be 
encroached upon by her home state, will turn, at least in part, on normative 
considerations under virtually every theory of constitutional interpretation. 
Normative considerations are likely to be doctrinally relevant in two 
additional respects, though some background first must be laid to see how.  
Even if it should be determined that extraterritorial regulations of the sort 
imposed by Utah in our hypothetical implicate any or all of the above-
mentioned constitutional principles as a threshold matter, the question would 
arise whether a particular extraterritorial regulation violated the constitutional 
provision.122  This is so because virtually no constitutional principles are 
categorical.  For example, though the Speech Clause “embodies our profound 
national commitment to the free exchange of ideas,” and while it is true that 
“[a]s a general matter, the First Amendment means that government has no 
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, 
or its content,” the Supreme Court also has noted that “this principle, like other 
First Amendment principles, is not absolute.”123  Consistent with this, “free 
speech doctrine permits government to restrict a non-trivial quantum of 
expression on account of content.”124  Thus the mere fact that a given 
 
 122. Professor Fallon makes this point with regard to the right to travel.  See Fallon, supra 
note 2, at 638 (observing that although “[i]t is surely arguable that state laws barring their citizens 
from procuring out-of-state abortions would violate the long recognized constitutional right of 
interstate travel . . . [,] [i]t would probably be a mistake . . . to regard it as simply settled that a 
state’s prohibition against out-of-state abortions of fetuses conceived within the prohibiting state 
would always and necessarily violate the right to travel.”). 
 123. Aschcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (internal quotation omitted). 
 124. Rosen, Institutional Context, supra note 55, at 249.  Indeed, 
[n]ot only may American governments regulate obscene materials and fighting words, but 
government may ban speech that constitutes espionage, enact “content-based advertising 
restrictions” in relation to the sale of securities, prohibit the advocacy of illegal activities, 
enact “content-based [regulations] of [labor union] elections and election campaigns—
including restrictions on accurate representations by employers about the future 
consequences of unionization,” and more. 
See id. (internal quotation and citations omitted).  Relatedly, Adam Winkler recently has shown 
that constitutional principles that give rise to strict scrutiny of legislative and executive actions 
very frequently do not result in determinations that the governmental actions are unconstitutional.  
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expression triggers free speech principles as a threshold matter does not mean 
that government regulation of that expression violates the Constitution. 
What is true for the speech principle is true for the constitutional right to 
travel principle as well.  Thus the Court has explicitly held that the “second 
component of the right to travel” provides “protections [that] are not 
‘absolute’”—states are not categorically proscribed from discriminating 
against citizens who are visiting from other states, but only are prevented from 
“discriminat[ing] against citizens of other States where there is no substantial 
reason for the discrimination . . . .”125  What the Court has identified as the 
“third” component of the right to travel likewise appears not to be 
categorical.126  Accordingly, even if the Court were to recognize a fourth 
component of the right to travel that encompassed state efforts to 
extraterritorially regulate their citizens, the Court would then have to devise a 
legal test to gauge such regulations’ constitutionality.  The same would be true 
if the Court were to decide that a home state’s extraterritorial regulations 
implicated the “privileges or immunities” of national citizenship. 
It is at this point that normative considerations once again come into play.  
Why is it that constitutional principles (almost always) are not categorical?127  
Part of the answer128 clearly is this: the absence of categorical prohibitions 
reflects the Court’s appreciation of the fact that there always are countervailing 
 
See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny 
in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006). 
 125. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501–02 (1999) (internal citations omitted).  The second 
component of the right to travel, said the Court, has a textual basis in the Constitution: Article 
IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, which was discussed above.  See id. at 501. 
 126. See id. at 504.  The Court declined to precisely identify the appropriate standard for 
reviewing state regulations that implicate this component of the right to travel.  See id.  At one 
point the Court stated that “[t]he appropriate standard may be more categorical than that 
articulated” in Shapiro v. Thompson.  Id.  The Shapiro Court used a standard very close to strict 
scrutiny, holding that a classification violated equal protection unless it could have been “shown 
to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.” Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 
618, 634 (1969).  Yet, the Saenz opinion subsequently spent five pages analyzing the 
justifications California gave for its regulation.  Saenz, 526 U.S. at 504–08.  Had the 
constitutional principle operated categorically, there would have been no need for the Saenz Court 
to undertake such analysis. 
 127. The only contemporary exceptions are the Court’s quasi-Tenth Amendment categorical 
anti-commandeering rules.  See Mark D. Rosen, Modeling Constitutional Doctrine, 49 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 691, 703–04 (2005).  For a strong critique of the Court’s decision to operationalize the 
constitutional anti-commandeering principle by means of categorical legal tests, see Vicki C. 
Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
2180, 2182–83 (1998); see also Rosen, supra, at 703–06. 
 128. Answering this is surprisingly difficult because of an unfortunate truth: despite the 
paucity of categorical constitutional principles and the ubiquity of non-categorical legal tests, see 
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001), neither the Court nor 
scholars have paid much attention to the criteria for selecting the appropriate legal test.  See 
Rosen, supra note 127, at 704–06; Rosen, Institutional Context, supra note 55, at 234 & n.58. 
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considerations of which constitutional doctrine appropriately takes account.129  
Stated differently, life and the world are too complex to have “absolute” 
constitutional doctrines that categorically bar the government from regulating 
speech, interfering with the free exercise of religion, and so forth.  Rather, even 
our most special and fundamental rights and liberties can be regulated—
typically for only “compelling interests” and in “narrowly tailored” ways 
pursuant to “strict scrutiny,” but sometimes for even less significant 
governmental interests and in less precisely targeted ways.130  Choosing which 
non-categorical legal test is to be used to evaluate governmental action that 
implicates constitutionally protected interests invariably reflects an assessment 
of the strength of the countervailing considerations in relation to the weight of 
the constitutional principle against which they cut.  Such determinations, it 
would seem, invariably will turn at least in part—and, more likely, 
primarily131—on normative considerations.132 
Normative considerations play an important role at yet one additional 
point.  Even after the legal test has been chosen, courts must decide when the 
 
 129. For example, under contemporary doctrine, although women unquestionably have a 
constitutional privacy interest in relation to abortion, the Court has concluded that the state has an 
interest in the health of the unborn fetus.  The legal test that the Court has devised to measure the 
constitutionality of state laws that regulate abortion prior to viability—the “undue burden” 
standard—is, according to the Court, the “appropriate means of reconciling the State’s interest 
with the woman’s constitutionally protected liberty.”  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992). 
 130. For example, although abortion rights are an aspect of fundamental privacy rights, the 
undue burden standard that presently applies to abortion regulations is less strict than strict 
scrutiny.  Id. at 846–48, 871 (justifying adoption of the undue burden standard on the basis that it 
is less strict than strict scrutiny and affords the state greater leeway in regulating in relation to the 
“potential life” of the fetus). 
 131. Though I need not establish this stronger proposition for purposes of this Article, the 
intuition behind the proposition is that the selection of appropriate legal tests is not generally 
informed by textual or historical analysis.  Constitutional text mentions none of the legal tests that 
populate our constitutional jurisprudence; if anything, text almost always suggests that 
constitutional principles are categorical, a doctrinal approach that contemporary constitutional 
jurisprudence almost always rejects.  See Rosen, supra note 127, at 705.  Nor did the Framers 
discuss legal tests.  What is left in choosing the appropriate legal test, then, is precedent and 
normative considerations. 
 132. In this regard I largely agree with Justice Scalia’s argument in his dissent in Casey that 
application of the undue burden standard invariably is dependent upon a “value judgment” as to 
the comparative value of the woman’s liberty to choose and the fetus.  See Casey, 505 U.S. at 983 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).  But I reject Justice Scalia’s 
assumption that the Court can act in a manner that sidesteps value judgments of these sort.  The 
way to maintain the Court’s legitimacy is not by demanding that it avoid value judgments—
something I believe to be impossible—but by expanding the institutional actors that actively 
participate in determining what our Constitution requires.  Much of my recent work, and several 
ongoing projects, seek to work out the implications of these ideas.  See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 
12, at 967–77. 
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test has been satisfied such that the governmental action survives constitutional 
challenge.  Excellent empirical analysis has definitively established that even 
“strict scrutiny” is not always (or even generally) fatal in practice; courts not 
infrequently determine that strictly protected constitutional interests can be 
regulated because there are countervailing governmental interests that count as 
“compelling.”133  The determination of what countervailing government 
interests are compelling invariably requires a normative assessment.134 
To quickly summarize, normative considerations likely enter constitutional 
analysis at three distinct points: (1) the threshold definition of the scope of the 
constitutional principle, (2) the choice among non-categorical legal tests to 
operationalize the constitutional principle, and (3) the determination of which 
governmental policies satisfy the chosen legal test. 
B. Normative Considerations: The Difficult Choice Between “Soft” and 
“Hard” Pluralism (Point Six) 
Having shown immediately above in Section A (point five) that normative 
considerations invariably will inform the development of the constitutional 
doctrines that are relevant to analyzing Utah’s hypothetical regulation, this 
Section B labors to make the relatively modest point that there are strong 
normative arguments for two contending positions.  The discussion in this 
point six is not designed to definitively vindicate one of the two candidates, but 
to lay the foundation for the next subsection’s institutional conclusion that 
difficult normative decisions of this sort are better undertaken by the more 
political branches (Congress and the President) than by courts. 
1. Defining “Soft” and “Hard” Pluralism 
Let us return to our hypothetical: should Utah have the power to preclude 
Mary from obtaining an abortion in California?  The first position, that Utah 
should not be able to regulate Mary extraterritorially, has been well stated by 
many able scholars135 and has obvious appeal to many.  Arguments that have 
been made on its behalf primarily boil down to two claims: that disenabling 
Utah (1) enhances the liberty of individuals such as Mary and (2) vindicates 
the primacy of national citizenship.  As to the first, disallowing such 
extraterritorial regulation expands Mary’s liberty, it is said, by enabling her to 
do something in California that she is not permitted to do in her home state of 
Utah.  This theme has been elaborated in near-poetic ways by Professor 
 
 133. See Winkler, supra note 124, at 812–23, 833–69. 
 134. Indeed, in practice it may involve a comparative assessment of the strength of the 
countervailing considerations in relation to the constitutional principle against which they cut, 
though this stronger proposition is not essential to the argument here. 
 135. See, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 82, at 876; Kreimer, supra note 8; Kreimer, The Law of 
Choice and Choice of Law, supra note 19. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] “HARD” OR “SOFT” PLURALISM? 745 
Kreimer.  Permitting Utah to extraterritorially regulate is tantamount to making 
Mary “carry home-state law with [her] as [she] travel[s], like escaped prisoners 
dragging a ball and chain.”136  “In our federal system,” he also has said, “by 
stepping over [state] lines an American citizen may claim her freedom.”137 
As to the second claim concerning the primacy of national citizenship, 
consider the following statement: 
At the time the United States was founded, one could conceive of American 
citizenship as derived from a more basic identification with each of the 
component states . . . . 
  . . . At the time of the Civil War, Robert E. Lee resigned his federal 
commission, and renounced his oath of allegiance because as a “Virginian” he 
could not bear to honor that oath.  It is hard today to find a citizen of the 
United States who conceives of her primary identity as a “Virginian” or a 
“Pennsylvanian” or an “Oregonian,” rather than an “American,” and our nation 
is stronger for this fact. 
  In my view, it is precisely the fact that a resident of Pennsylvania comes to 
New Jersey as an American citizen that entitles her without blame to take 
advantage of the “privileges and immunities” offered by New Jersey, whether 
to wager on games of chance or to end an unwanted pregnancy.  This does no 
violence to the authority of Pennsylvania within its boundaries but recognizes 
that the primary moral community to which we all owe allegiance is that of the 
United States of America.138 
I shall have a few critical words to say about these arguments in support of the 
first position, but first let me sketch the second plausible position. 
The second position, that Utah should have the power to prohibit Mary 
from obtaining an abortion in California, also has significant force.  Under our 
federal system, states may have diverse policies in relation to matters that 
neither the Constitution nor federal law demands nationwide uniformity.  But, 
as regards a non-trivial set of laws, such pluralism of policy choices can be 
undermined if the citizen of a state that prohibits the activity in question can 
simply travel to a state that does not proscribe the activity and do there what 
her home state proscribes—what might be called “travel-evasion” from the 
perspective of her home state.139  Accordingly, what is at stake in determining 
whether Utah can regulate Mary such that she does not engage in “travel-
evasion” of legitimate Utah laws is the extent to which states can maintain 
efficacious diverse policies in relation to those matters that neither the 
Constitution nor other federal law demands nationwide uniformity. 
 
 136. Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law, supra note 19, at 463. 
 137. Kreimer, supra note 8, at 1017. 
 138. Id. at 983–84. 
 139. See Rosen, supra note 3. 
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To be clear, extraterritorial regulation to address potential travel-evasion is 
not confined to the context of abortion.  The possibility of travel-evasion in 
relation to state law is present whenever State B permits an activity that State 
A prohibits for paternalistic purposes, to protect third-party interests, or to 
generate norms in State A.140  Consider, for instance, a state law that bans 
gambling: the state policies of protecting the gambler from himself and 
protecting his family’s assets will be largely vitiated if the gambler is free to 
gamble in Las Vegas.  The same is true of state laws banning assisted suicide, 
mandating motorcycle helmets, and, if Roe v. Wade were to be overruled, 
proscribing abortions.  Indeed, even if Roe v. Wade remains good law, the 
issue of travel-evasion arises in relation to abortion-related laws such as 
parental notification statutes.141  Moreover, the problem of travel-evasion is not 
confined to “hot-button” cultural conflict issues, but can arise in the 
commercial context.  For example, Wisconsin not long ago sought to apply its 
substantively constitutional dairy regulations to milk sales by large Wisconsin 
dairy farms that were consummated in Illinois so as to evade Wisconsin 
regulations that aimed to protect third party interests.142 
Notice the connection between the power of states to prevent travel-
evasion and the degree of political pluralism that can be expected to be found 
across the country.  If travel-evasion can be legally targeted, then states can 
ensure full enforcement of their laws; the mere fact that State B chooses not to 
 
 140. State policies that aim to norm-generate can be subject to travel-evasion insofar as norm 
inculcation is a function of the widespread practice of persons that an individual knows.  Norm-
generation may be undercut if I know that my neighbor is undertaking in a neighboring state the 
very acts that our home state prohibits.  See id. at 915. 
 141. Travel-evasion was the predicate, in fact, for bills recently enacted by the House and 
Senate.  See supra note 13; Child Custody Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 1755 Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (2004) 
(“Despite widespread support for parental involvement laws and clear public policy 
considerations justifying them, substantial evidence exists that such laws are regularly evaded by 
adults who transport minors to abortion providers in States that do not have parental notification 
or consent laws.  The Child Custody Protection Act would curb the interstate circumvention of 
these laws.”) (statement of Rep. Steve Chabot, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Constitution); see 
also Child Custody Protection Act, S. 851, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 142. The Wisconsin regulators were concerned that smaller dairy farms were being driven out 
of business because purchasers of raw milk paid premiums to large Wisconsin dairy farms in 
excess of the economic savings that attended the purchase of milk for large farms.  Dean Foods 
Co. v. Brancel, 187 F.3d 609, 611 (7th Cir. 1999).  To deprive large Wisconsin farms of financial 
benefits that were not the result of economic efficiencies and thereby engender fairer competition, 
Wisconsin prohibited premiums to the extent they exceeded the real economic savings of 
purchasing milk from large farms.  Id.  The large Wisconsin farms then engaged in classic travel-
evasion: with the express purpose of avoiding the Wisconsin law, they restructured the sales so 
that they technically were consummated in Illinois, which did not have such a restriction on 
premiums.  Id. at 612.  Wisconsin then sought to apply its regulations extraterritorially to those 
Illinois sales.  Id.; see also Rosen, supra note 3, at 930–31 (discussing Dean Foods). 
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proscribe what State A prohibits does not mean that State A’s citizens can 
effectively opt out of State A’s laws by the expedient of driving to State B.  A 
federal regime in which travel-evasion can be targeted thus allows for the 
possibility of what might be called “hard” pluralism: states can establish 
efficacious regulations across the spectrum of policies with regard to which 
federal law does not demand nationwide uniformity.143  By contrast, the first 
position sketched above—under which Utah cannot regulate Mary’s California 
conduct—can be usefully described as a regime of “soft” pluralism: states can 
regulate as they wish as regards matters that federal law does not require 
national uniformity, but they can make sure that their citizens abide by their 
policies only when their citizens are physically located within the state’s 
borders.  Under a regime of “soft” pluralism, the ready possibility of crossing a 
border to a more regulatorily relaxed state undermines the extent to which the 
more regulatorily-heavy states can, as a practical matter, regulate as they see 
fit.  A regime of “soft” pluralism—a system in which states cannot proscribe 
travel evasion—accordingly has a systematic bias against efficacious 
regulation of matters about which there is not a national consensus.  Indeed, 
this characteristic of “soft” pluralism is explicitly lauded by its proponents: 
“Where the moral judgment of two sovereigns clashes, federalism leaves the 
citizen some opportunity to take advantage of the judgment of either.”144 
2. Clarifying What Appropriately Informs the Choice Between “Soft” 
and “Hard” Pluralism 
What should inform the choice between “soft” and “hard” pluralism?  
Though I personally am sympathetic to “hard” pluralism,145 my interest here is 
not to convince the reader of its superiority, but only to clarify what is really at 
stake in choosing between these two options.  In so doing, though, I must 
critique some of the aforementioned arguments that have been made on behalf 
of “soft” pluralism. 
To begin, let us recall the argument that constitutional doctrine 
appropriately disallows Utah from prohibiting Mary from obtaining an 
abortion in California because such a doctrine augments Mary’s liberty.  This 
is the assumption behind the claim that “by stepping over [state] lines an 
 
 143. Of course, the existence of state and/or federal power to target travel-evasion does not 
entail the exercise of that power.  A federal regime of “hard” pluralism thus would allow room for 
State A to decide to limit its citizen’s activities only for so long as she remains within State A’s 
border.  But this only underscores the political diversity that a “hard diversity” regime creates: 
under such a regime, with respect to policies that federal law does not require national uniformity, 
a state may decide (1) to not regulate its citizens at all, (2) to regulate its citizens only for so long 
as they are physically present within the state, or (3) to regulate its citizens when they are both in 
state and out of state. 
 144. Kreimer, supra note 8, at 1017. 
 145. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 911–13. 
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American citizen may claim her freedom.”146  This argument, however, is 
premised on a mistaken conception of the telos of constitutional law that most 
people do not share and that actually bears no particular relationship to the 
issue of extraterritoriality.  Contrary to this argument’s implicit assumption, 
the touchstone for constitutionality is not whether a proposed doctrine 
minimizes the degree to which government may regulate and thereby 
“interfere” with an individual’s liberty to do what she wishes.  Rather, 
regulations that restrict an individual’s liberty to act may be constitutionally 
legitimate when they seek to achieve any one of an array of goals, including 
the protection of third party interests and the pursuit of paternalism and norm 
generation.147  This is not to say that state regulations that aim to accomplish 
these goals are always constitutional; federal constitutional principles impose 
many limits on what and how states may regulate.  But when state regulations 
do not run afoul of these constitutional limitations, there is no self-evident 
normative basis for saying that a proposed constitutional doctrine “enhances” 
liberty by enabling persons to avoid otherwise constitutional state regulations 
that are applicable to her. 
Indeed, further reflection suggests that the foundation for the liberty-
enhancing argument in support of “soft” pluralism must either be substantive 
opposition to Utah’s law or libertarian desire to minimize government 
regulation in general.  Substantive opposition to Utah’s law, however, is not an 
appropriate normative basis for advocating constitutional doctrines that restrict 
state extraterritorial regulation as a general matter.  Although libertarian 
opposition to regulation as a general matter is a plausible normative 
commitment that could inform constitutional doctrine on many theories of 
constitutional interpretation, one who is persuaded by the liberty-enhancing 
argument against extraterritoriality should realize that libertarianism is what 
she really is embracing. 
The second argument offered on behalf of “soft” pluralism—that national 
citizenship today does and should supersede state citizenship—also misses the 
mark (though, as I shall show, it at least points us in the right direction).  
Constitutional doctrine that permitted Utah to extraterritorially regulate Mary 
would not pit Utah against the nation and amount to a victory of state 
citizenship as against national citizenship.  Rather, doctrine that permitted such 
extraterritorial regulation would help create a federal union in which national 
citizenship had a particular content and meaning.  More specifically, a regime 
of “hard” pluralism defines our nation as a union of states that, with regard to 
those policies about which there is no federal requirement of national 
uniformity, have the power both to enact laws that embody policies that are at 
 
 146. Kreimer, supra note 8, at 1017. 
 147. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 883. 
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odds with their neighbors’ policies and to ensure that such laws are strongly 
enforced. 
A federal system in which states had such powers is not tantamount to a 
regime in which national citizenship takes a second seat to state citizenship.  
The normative justification for a regime of “hard” pluralism is not that an 
individual’s identity as a resident of Illinois is more significant to her than her 
American identity; I fully concur with Professor Kreimer both that this is 
unlikely to be the case today and that the emergence of a dominant national 
identity is a good thing.148  Rather, the justification for a regime of “hard” 
pluralism (to the extent there is a plausible justification) is that our country’s 
enormous population and its citizens’ diverse preferences make a regime of 
“hard” pluralism normatively attractive.  In short, at issue is not whether state 
citizenship takes precedence over federal citizenship, but the nature of national 
citizenship in our federal union. 
The normative attractiveness of “hard” pluralism is based on three distinct 
considerations that have been well rehearsed by federalism scholars.  First, 
given the diversity of political commitments held by people in our large 
country, it may be desirable to allow the fullest possible political expression to 
those policies that federal law does not require national uniformity.  Second, it 
may be beneficial to allow states to experiment with different policies that 
national law does not, at any given point in time, demand national 
uniformity.149  Third, it may be desirable to give the citizens of our enormous 
country an opportunity to actively participate in sub-federal democratic 
politics, and this may be facilitated by giving room for people to participate in 
lawmaking in respect of matters about which people feel strongly.  The 
argument in support of “hard” pluralism is that it supports these three goals 
more than “soft” pluralism does. 
In short, it is no contradiction in terms to feel primary allegiance to a 
national identity that is committed to allowing “hard” pluralism at the sub-
federal levels in respect of policies that neither the United States Constitution 
nor federal statutes demand national uniformity.  Neither the “nature” of 
national citizenship nor the primary role that national citizenship plays for 
most of us answers the question of whether Utah should be able 
extraterritorially regulate Mary.  Professor Kreimer’s “national primacy” 
argument points to the right direction, but it buries the difficult normative 
analysis that appropriately informs the choice between “hard” and “soft” 
 
 148. See Kreimer, supra note 8, at 983–84. 
 149. These two arguments—diversity and experimentalism—are distinct.  “Experimentalism” 
anticipates the possibility that one policy may be proven over time to be superior to others such 
that it may become the single or dominant policy, whereas “diversity” contentedly contemplates 
the possibility of enduring differences in policy commitments. 
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pluralism.  And that very difficult question is as follows: what kind of federal 
union do we want to have? 
C. Institutional Considerations (Point Seven) 
As shown above in points one to three, under current doctrine states have 
the power to extraterritorially regulate their citizens to address travel-evasion.  
That is to say, the current answer to the question of whether, as a purely 
descriptive matter, our federal union is one of “hard” or “soft” pluralism is the 
former.  I also have labored to show in point four, however, that this status quo 
is not necessarily stable because (among other reasons) it has not received 
extensive attention and there are several plausible constitutional principles that 
could be developed in a way that would constrain such state extraterritorial 
powers. 
This final part of the Article considers which societal actors are best 
situated to choosing between “hard” and “soft” pluralism.  My argument is that 
it is perfectly sensible for states to currently have the power to extraterritorially 
regulate, and for them to exercise the power as they wish.  This will give our 
society data points as to how such a system will operate in practice.  
Ultimately, however, I conclude that federal institutions are better situated to 
answering the question of what type of federal union our country should have.  
Further, I argue that the Congress and the President, by means of legislation, 
are institutionally superior to federal courts for the purpose of choosing 
between “hard” and “soft” federalism.  The Article then concludes by 
identifying the appropriate sources of congressional power for making such a 
decision: (1) the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s “Effects” Clause, (2) Section 
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to create legislation that “enforces” what is 
entailed by national citizenship, and possibly (3) Article IV’s Privileges and 
Immunities Clause.  Although the Commerce Clause also potentially could be 
relied upon, it is a less conceptually suited constitutional locus than these other 
provisions to the task at hand of deciding the nature of our federal union. 
1. The Superiority of Federal to State Actors 
Once it is clearly understood what is at stake in determining the scope of 
states’ extraterritorial powers, it readily follows that federal actors are 
institutionally superior to individual states in making the decision.  The choice 
between “hard” and “soft” pluralism has important implications in respect of 
the character of our federal union: is it a union in which national citizenship 
entails that all citizens can have ready access to the laws and public goods of 
all states, or is it a union in which a sub-federal polity can ensure that its 
citizens abide by its distinctive public policies wherever she may be for so long 
as she remains a citizen of the state?  The federal government is well-suited 
because it is inclusive of all interested parties; the political body that represents 
all should make decisions that concern the character of the whole.  The 
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individual states are not well-suited to deciding the nature of national 
citizenship and our federal union.  They can be expected to give short shrift to 
systemic federal considerations because looking out for the federal union is not 
part of their charge. 
A similar conclusion emerges when one scales back the level of generality 
and abstraction of what is at issue.  The question posed by our hypothetical 
concerning Mary is the scope of states’ regulatory jurisdiction.  What political 
entity is best suited to answering the question?  States cannot be trusted to be 
the final arbiters of their own powers for two reasons.  First, they (like all 
bureaucracies) are inclined to augment the scope of their own powers even 
absent good policy reasons for doing so.  Second, there is a problem of 
externalities; the “costs” of a state expanding its extraterritorial powers will fall 
in significant part upon non-citizens, persons who are not politically 
represented in the state that is making the decision. 
The federal government does not fall prey to these two structural 
disadvantages.  To take the second concern first, the federal government 
represents all states.  When it determines the scope of states’ extraterritorial 
powers, the federal government’s decisions accordingly impose no 
externalities on unrepresented outsiders.  This is why the federal government is 
better suited than the states themselves to umpiring states’ powers vis-B-vis one 
another.  As to the first concern, there is little room for worry that the federal 
government will act in a self-aggrandizing manner when it decides horizontal 
federalism matters; sorting out the powers that states have vis-B-vis one 
another does not increase federal power at the expense of states and so does 
not invite the concerns that attend allowing a bureaucracy to define the scope 
of its own powers.150  In short, determining the scope of subfederal polities’ 
regulatory powers in relation to one another is a “quintessentially federal 
function.”151 
2. The Superiority of Congress (and the President) to Courts 
a. Congress’s Institutional Superiority 
Even if (as I argued above) the federal government is institutionally 
superior to states to the task of choosing between “hard” and “soft” pluralism, 
the question remains as to how the decision-making appropriately is divided 
among the various branches of the federal government.  The analysis provided 
above in point six (which identified the strong normative considerations in 
favor of both “hard” and “soft” pluralism) in conjunction with point four’s 
 
 150. See Metzger, supra note 10, at 1513 (explaining that “the dangers of congressional 
aggrandizement are mitigated in interstate or horizontal federalism contexts” unlike the context of 
vertical federalism). 
 151. See Rosen, supra note 12, at 940. 
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observation (that the choice between the two regimes has not been clearly 
made by constitutional text, history, or precedent) jointly suggest that the more 
political branches of the federal government are better suited than courts to 
making such an inherently subjective, political choice.  Courts simply do not 
have any particular institutional competency in choosing among the competing 
normative considerations to make the choice between “hard” and “soft” 
pluralism. 
Only clear cut institutional advantages would justify allocating this heavily 
normative-based decision to the least democratically accountable branch of 
government.  I see no reasons for concluding that Congress (in conjunction 
with the President’s participation via, among other things, the constitutional 
requirement of Presentment) is institutionally incapable or suspect in regard to 
making the intrinsically normative, political decision as to what type of federal 
union we are to have.  Indeed, there are reasons to believe that Congress is a 
superior forum for the principled investigation and debate of such deeply 
normative questions,152 though more attention than I can commit here is 
appropriately devoted to these issues of each branch’s institutional 
competencies. 
b. Constitutional Bases for Congress’s Powers 
There are four constitutional texts that could provide a basis for 
congressional legislation that would choose between “hard” and “soft” 
pluralism.  The grant of congressional power most closely allied to 
determining the scope of states’ regulatory authority is the “Effects Clause” of 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause.  The first clause of that provision states that 
“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts . . . of 
every other State,” and the so-called “Effects” clause provides that “Congress 
may by general Laws prescribe . . . the Effect” of such “Acts.”153  The term 
“public Acts” long has been understood to encompass state legislation,154 and 
so the Full Faith and Credit Clause grants Congress the power to determine 
what effect one state’s legislation is to have in another state.  Applied to our 
hypothetical, the Effects Clause gives Congress the power to determine 
whether Utah law would have effect vis-B-vis Mary while she was in 
California. 
This use of the Effects Clause is consistent with the way scholars long 
have understood it.  There have been longstanding scholarly calls for Congress 
to enact legislation that would provide federal choice-of-law rules to replace 
the hodgepodge of state choice-of-law rules that currently are relied upon to 
 
 152. See generally Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 
YALE L.J. 1346 (2006) (criticizing judicial review of legislation). 
 153. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1. 
 154. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998). 
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resolve virtually all choice-of-law questions.155  Whether Mary is subject to 
Utah or California abortion law when she is in California can be usefully 
understood as a conflict-of-laws question.  More generally, determining the 
scope of states’ extraterritorial regulatory powers is an aspect of the conflict-
of-laws that falls to Congress via the Effects Clause, either on its own or by 
virtue of the Effects Clause in conjunction with the Sweeping Clause. 
Further, there is little question that, under the contemporary case law that 
defines the scope of the Effects Clause, Congress has the power to enact the 
type of legislation at issue here.  The Court has observed that the Effects 
Clause gives Congress the power to enact rules regarding the requirements of 
full faith and credit that vary from those that the Court has identified.156  
Though there is some uncertainty in the case law whether this embraces 
congressional power to determine that a public act or judgment is to be given 
less effect than what the Court has determined,157 the Court has stated 
explicitly that Congress has the power to give greater effect to a state law than 
the Court has held to be required by the Full Faith and Credit Clause.158 
The type of legislation under consideration here would best be 
characterized as either confirming what Full Faith and Credit case law already 
permits (if Congress opted for “soft” pluralism) or as increasing the full faith 
and credit that otherwise is permitted by contemporary jurisprudence (if 
Congress opted for “hard” pluralism) and, for these reasons, unquestionably 
could be enacted under Congress’s Effects Clause powers.159  To understand 
the relationship between the legislation under consideration here and the 
Court’s Full Faith and Credit jurisprudence, it first is necessary to understand 
the general contours of Full Faith and Credit case law.  While early Supreme 
Court case law interpreting the Full Faith and Credit Clause required State A to 
 
 155. See, e.g., William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 
42 (1963); Walter Wheeler Cook, The Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, 28 YALE L.J. 421, 432–33 (1919); Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: 
The Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1 (1991). 
 156. See Rosen, supra note 12, at 965–66. 
 157. See id. at 967.  Though I have strongly critiqued this “one-way” ratchet approach to 
congressional power under the Effects Clause, see id. at 954–57, the persuasiveness of my 
argument is not relevant here because Congress would have the power to enact the legislation 
under consideration even under the “one-way” ratchet approach for the reasons discussed above 
in text. 
 158. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 729 (1988).  I discuss this case fully in 
Rosen, supra note 12, at 965–66. 
 159. Let me stave off potential confusion: that contemporary doctrines examined in Parts I 
and II (Due Process, Dormant Commerce Clause, right to travel, Privileges and Immunities, 
Privileges or Immunities) give rise to a regime of “hard” pluralism is not inconsistent with the 
fact that a different constitutional doctrine—that of Full Faith and Credit—does not require that 
California apply Utah law in its courts. 
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apply the law of State B if State B had a superior interest in the matter,160 
modern cases have loosened this understanding of full faith and credit and now 
permit State A to apply its law so long as State A has sufficient contacts such 
that applying its law would not violate due process.161  In short, early case law 
adopted a “multilateralist” approach under which full faith and credit 
determinations were based on a comparison of the competing states’ interests 
in regulating a particular matter, whereas contemporary law has adopted a 
“unilateralist” approach that only considers whether the state seeking to apply 
its law has at least a minimum quantum of contacts.162  Today’s unilateralist 
approach hence is a less strict approach to what full faith and credit requires 
than was the “multilateralist” approach of yesteryear’s jurisprudence.  
Accordingly, regardless of whether Congress adopted legislation that reflected 
a choice of “soft” or “hard” pluralism, any such legislation would fall under 
Congress’s Effects Clause powers: legislation indicating that Utah did not have 
extraterritorial regulatory authority would be consistent with contemporary 
Full Faith and Credit doctrine, and legislation determining that Utah did have 
the power to extraterritorially regulate Mary would increase the full faith and 
credit that California would be required to give to Utah law and thereby also 
would uncontroversially fall within Congress’s Effects Clause powers.163 
There is a second constitutional text on which Congress could rely to 
determine the scope of states’ extraterritorial regulatory powers that is less 
obvious than the Effects Clause but is, in my view, equally sound as a 
conceptual matter.  As discussed above, the extent of state extraterritorial 
powers is one of the determinants of what it means to be a citizen of the United 
States in respect of our country’s federal union.  As such, a strong argument 
can be made that Congress has power under Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to “enforce by appropriate legislation”164 Section One’s guarantee 
that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges of immunities of citizens of the United States” by defining what is 
entailed by “citizen[ship] of the United States” and its “privileges and 
immunities.”165 
 
 160. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 961–62 (discussing Bradford Elec. Light Co., Inc. v. 
Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932) and several other cases). 
 161. See Rosen, supra note 12, at 933 & n.60. 
 162. See William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument 
for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101, 107–110 (1998) (providing a useful 
discussion of unilateralism and multilateralism). 
 163. Institutional reasons can explain why courts were unsuited to making multilateralist 
determinations but that Congress is well-suited to making such determinations.  See Rosen, supra 
note 99, at 817–23. 
 164. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §5. 
 165. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. 
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As sensible as this may seem, the contemporary jurisprudence inaugurated 
by City of Boerne v. Flores166 casts doubt on (though does not definitively 
decide the question of) congressional power to determine the scope of state 
extraterritorial powers pursuant to Section Five.  This is so because Boerne 
limits Congress’s Section Five powers to providing “congruent and 
proportional” steps to remedy or prevent state violations of Sections One 
through Four of the Fourteenth Amendment as it specifically denies Congress 
the power to define the scope of the substantive protections afforded in 
Sections One through Four.167 
On the other hand, there is no basis in the case law for concluding that 
Boerne’s constraints apply to substantive provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment that the Court expressly has not expounded in full, such as the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause.168  Indeed, many of the concerns animating 
the Boerne Court would be absent in this context.  The Boerne Court was quite 
clearly incensed that Congress sought to effectively undo the Court’s 
constitutional ruling in the Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources of Oregon v. Smith169 case, and legislation that expanded on what 
the Court acknowledged to be only an incomplete list of national privileges or 
immunities would not be a “dis” to the Court in the way that the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act was (and in fact may not be disrespectful to the Court 
in any respect whatsoever).170  The Boerne Court also was concerned by the 
“substantial costs RFRA exacts, both in practical terms of imposing a heavy 
litigation burden on the States and in terms of curtailing their traditional 
general regulatory power . . . .”171  Such concerns are present when Congress 
relies on Section Five to readjust “vertical” federalism’s boundaries between 
federal and state regulatory authority, but they are not raised by legislation 
directed at the “horizontal” federalism issue of determining the scope of states’ 
extraterritorial regulatory authorities in relation to one another.  
Notwithstanding these very real differences between the type of legislation that 
post-Boerne jurisprudence has struck down and the legislation contemplated 
here, one could not be certain that the Court would uphold congressional 
power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine the 
scope of states’ extraterritorial powers. 
Another possible source of congressional power to decide between “hard” 
and “soft” pluralism is Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause.  
Although the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not contain an explicit 
 
 166. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 167. See id. at 519–20. 
 168. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 169. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 170. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519–20. 
 171. Id. at 534. 
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grant of congressional power, and though other provisions in Article IV do, 
Professor Gillian Metzger has provided a powerful argument that the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause nonetheless should be understood as 
granting Congress legislative powers.172  If the Clause indeed were a source of 
congressional power, the Privileges and Immunities Clause could be an 
additional source for Congress’s power to enact the legislation under 
contemplation here.  This is so because the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
addresses the way that visitors are to be treated when they are in sister states, 
and there is obvious overlap between the status of visitors and a home state’s 
extraterritorial regulatory powers in relation to its traveling citizens. 
The final constitutional provision Congress could rely upon to enact 
legislation concerning the scope of states’ extraterritorial regulatory powers is 
the all-purpose Commerce Clause, even after Lopez and its progeny.  In terms 
of the hypothetical immediately under consideration, Congress undoubtedly 
could decide that Mary either could or could not obtain an abortion in 
California insofar as abortion “substantially affects interstate commerce.”173 
While there certainly is a distinguished legacy of legislation enacted under 
the Commerce Clause that sought to accomplish policy objectives more 
conceptually tied to other constitutional grants of congressional power,174 there 
are strong reasons to believe that it would be preferable for Congress to utilize 
the constitutional provisions most conceptually suited to accomplishing the 
particular task at hand.  First, relying on the most conceptually appropriate 
constitutional provision may help maintain congressional clarity as to what the 
legislation is attempting to do (in this case, determining the scope of states’ 
regulatory authority and thereby deciding the nature of national citizenship in 
our federal union, just not regulating interstate commerce).  Second, relying on 
less apt constitutional provisions may interfere with maximal accomplishment 
of Congress’s policy goals; for instance, relying on the Commerce Clause 
eliminates congressional power to address states’ extraterritorial regulatory 
powers in relation to matters that do not have a substantial connection to 
interstate commerce.175  Third, to the extent there are constitutional limits that 
appropriately apply to Congress’s exercise of its power in relation to regulating 
states’ extraterritorial powers, it is better to create such doctrinal limitations in 
 
 172. See Metzger, supra note 10, at 1485–88. 
 173. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995). 
 174. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding civil 
rights legislation as a constitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power despite the 
fact that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment would have been the more conceptually 
appropriate basis for enacting civil rights legislation). 
 175. So, for example, the civil rights legislation at issue in Heart of Atlanta applied only to 
those private businesses large enough to satisfy the Commerce Clause’s requirements.  Id. at 247.  
Had the legislation rested solely on Congress’s Section Five power, there would have been no 
need to have such a size limitation. 
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the context of the specific constitutional doctrines that give rise to the 
congressional power rather than engraft such limitations onto general 
Commerce Clause doctrine, where the limitations may have unanticipated 
going-forward consequences when Congress seeks to regulate in very different 
contexts. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the conclusion that the Constitution gives 
Congress (and the President) primary responsibility for determining the scope 
of states’ extraterritorial powers does not mean that courts play no role.  Even 
absent any legislation whatsoever, it is perfectly appropriate for federal 
courts176 to decide whether a state has appropriately regulated extraterritorially 
under the doctrinal rubric of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s national Citizenship Clause and Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, or the right to travel.  Recognition that Congress plays the primary role 
in answering such questions means, however, that any judicial answers that 
precede legislation should not be viewed as limiting Congress if and when it 
elects to act.  Rather, any such judicial answers have the same status as the 
doctrine known as “Dormant Commerce Clause” that courts have developed 
when states regulate in respect of matters that Congress has the power to 
regulate under the Commerce Clause but has not (yet) regulated.  It is 
undisputed that if and when Congress exercises its Commerce Clause powers 
that had been dormant, it is not bound by the Court’s Dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine; Congress may go so far as to authorize states to regulate in 
ways that the Court had held to be impermissible under its Dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence.177  As I have argued elsewhere, the Dormant Commerce 
Clause is best conceptualized as a species of federal common law.178  Case law 
concerning the scope of states’ extraterritorial regulatory powers decided 
before Congress enacts legislation on the subject likewise should be deemed to 
be merely provisional federal common law that in no way diminishes 
Congress’s powers if and when it should choose to exercise them.179 
 
 176. Professor Bellia has made the interesting point that state courts typically have the power 
to make federal common law.  See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal 
Common Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 825, 839–51 (2005) (showing state courts’ role in the 
formulation of federal common law).  This might be unwelcome news in light of the analysis 
above giving rise to the conclusion that the federal government is better suited than states to 
deciding the questions of national identity that are raised by the issues discussed in this Article. 
 177. See Rosen, supra note 12, at 972–73. 
 178. Rosen, supra note 11. 
 179. Congress certainly may look to such case law for guidance when it makes its political 
decisions, though in so doing it must be careful to distinguish between (1) judicial doctrine that 
on a case-by-case, inductive basis has identified the principles and counter-principles that 
appropriately inform the ultimately normative decision that balances such competing 
considerations and (2) judicial doctrine that reflects appropriate judicial reluctance to resolve the 
substantive normative question on account of courts’ institutional limitations.  As I have argued 
elsewhere, the Full Faith and Credit jurisprudence that has rejected multilateralism and adopted 
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CONCLUSION 
Were Roe v. Wade to be overruled, Utah would have the power under 
contemporary constitutional jurisprudence to prohibit its citizen Mary from 
obtaining an abortion in California.  This assessment is based on two sub-
conclusions: that (1) states have extensive powers to regulate their own 
citizens’ out-of-state activities (under the Tenth Amendment and due process, 
and not disturbed by observations in recent Dormant Commerce Clause case 
law) and that (2) assorted constitutional side-constraints on state extraterritorial 
power, as presently construed by the Supreme Court, would not bar this 
particular Utah regulation (the right to travel, Article IV’s Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause and 
Privileges or Immunities Clause). 
While the existence of baseline state extraterritorial powers is both 
longstanding and wise and therefore unlikely to change, the jurisprudence 
concerning the side-constraints does not enjoy the same presumptive stability.  
Normative considerations invariably will influence the side-constraints’ 
ultimate doctrinal contours, and whether Utah should have the power to 
regulate Mary’s California activity implicates very deep questions concerning 
the nature of national citizenship in our federal union.  At issue ultimately is 
whether our country has a regime of “hard” or “soft” pluralism in respect of 
those policies that federal law does not require national uniformity, and the 
choice between the two has implications far beyond our unlikely hypothetical 
concerning Mary.  This is so because a home state’s power to apply its laws to 
its traveling citizens is relevant to a wide range of legitimate state laws whose 
policies can be effectively gutted if citizens can avail themselves of another 
state’s less restrictive laws by simply crossing a border. 
Although states largely have the power to decide for themselves whether to 
regulate their citizens’ extraterritorial activities at present, Congress has the 
power to effectively overrule state decisions in this regard and select either a 
regime of “hard” or “soft” pluralism via its powers under the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, and perhaps Article 
IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause.  This allocation of ultimate 
decisionmaking power is sensible.  Determining the scope of states’ regulatory 
authority and deciding between “soft” and “hard” pluralism are functions that 
properly fall to the federal government, rather than to the states, because how 
these issues are resolved are important determinants of the character of 
 
unilateralism by folding Full Faith and Credit analysis into the Due Process doctrine is best 
understood as doctrine that reflects lack of judicial competence in undertaking the complex 
balancing of incommensurable considerations that invariably is involved in determining which 
state has a greater interest in having its law applied in a given circumstance.  See Rosen, supra 
note 12, at 978 & n.236.  Legislatures, by contrast, are institutionally expected in our democratic 
system to render these sorts of highly subjective, political judgments. 
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national citizenship in respect of our federal union.  Moreover, these 
determinations fall more appropriately to the Congress (with presidential 
participation via the Presentment Clause) than to federal courts because the 
choice between “soft” and “hard” pluralism—a very hard choice indeed—will 
be driven by highly subjective judgments that are essentially political in 
character. 
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